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The ability to act on the world with the goal of gaining information is core to
human adaptability and intelligence. Perhaps the most successful and influen-
tial account of such abilities is the Optimal Experiment Design (OED) hypoth-
esis, which argues that humans intuitively perform experiments on the world
similar to the way an effective scientist plans an experiment. The widespread
application of this theory within many areas of psychology calls for a critical
evaluation of the theory’s core claims. Despite many successes, we argue that
the OED hypothesis remains lacking as a theory of human inquiry and that
research in the area often fails to confront some of the most interesting and
important questions. In this critical review, we raise and discuss nine open
questions about the psychology of human inquiry.
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Introduction
The ability to ask questions, collect informa-
tion, and actively explore one’s environment is a
powerful tool for learning about the world. How
do people decide which information to collect
in any given situation? One influential idea is
that information-seeking or inquiry behaviors are
akin to scientific experiments. According to this
metaphor, a child shaking a new toy, a student
asking a question, or a person trying out their first
smartphone, can all be compared to a scientist
conducting a carefully designed experiment to
test their hypotheses (Gopnik, 1996; Montessori,
1912/1964; Siegel, Magin, Tenenbaum, & Schulz,
2014). The core assumption in this work is
that people optimize their queries to achieve
their learning goals in the most efficient manner
possible.
To model everyday inquiry as scientific exper-
imentation, psychologists have been inspired by
the concept of “optimal experiment design” (OED)
from the statistics literature (Fedorov, 1972; Good,
1950; Lindley, 1956). OED is a general statistical
framework that quantifies the value of a possible
experiment with respect to the experimenter’s be-
liefs and learning goals and can help researchers
plan informative experiments. The psychologi-
cal claim is that humans perform “intuitive exper-
iments” that optimize the information gained from
their action in a similar way. Within psychology,
the OED hypothesis has been applied in many dif-
ferent areas including question asking, exploratory
behavior, causal learning, hypothesis testing, and
active perception (for overviews, see Gureckis
& Markant, 2012; J. D. Nelson, 2005; Schulz,
2012b).
It is easy to see why this metaphor is attractive to
psychologists. Not only does the OED hypothesis
offer an elegant mathematical framework to under-
stand and predict information-seeking behaviors, it
also offers a flattering perspective on human abili-
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ties by suggesting that everyone is, on some level,
an intuitive scientist. However, the status of OED
as the dominant formal framework for studying hu-
man inquiry calls for a critical evaluation of its ex-
planatory merits.
This paper addresses two overarching issues
concerning the current use of OED as a psycho-
logical theory. First, existing OED models rely on
on a wealth of non-trivial assumptions concerning
a learner’s prior knowledge, beliefs, cognitive
capacities, and goals. Our analysis critically
examines these assumptions and lays out future
research directions for how to better constrain
these choices. Second, some forms of human
inquiry cannot be easily expressed in terms of the
OED formalism. For example, inquiry does not
always start with an explicit hypothesis space, and
it is not always possible to compute the expected
value of a question. To that end, we highlight
research questions that lie outside the realm of the
OED framework and that are currently neglected
by the focus on inquiry as scientific hypothesis
testing.
Our hope is that this paper will serve both as
a critical comment on the limits of the OED hy-
pothesis within psychology and a roadmap of some
of the hardest but most interesting psychological
questions about human inquiry. The main part of
the paper takes the form of laying out nine ques-
tions about inquiry. For each question, we re-
view the current literature on the topic, examine
how past work has dealt with particular challenges,
and suggest promising future directions for work
within and outside the OED framework. Before
turning to these nine key questions, we review the
origin and core principles of the OED hypothesis,
and its history within psychology. We then con-
sider how best to evaluate the past successes of the
framework.
Human inquiry as optimal experiments
The metaphor of intuitive human inquiry as sci-
entific experimentation dates to the 1960s. This
early work compared people’s hypothesis testing
to philosophical norms of scientific experimenta-
tion, and most prominently to principles of falsi-
fication (Popper, 1968). Falsification turns out to
be a relatively poor description of human behav-
ior, however, and is now widely rejected as an ex-
planatory model (Klayman & Ha, 1989; Klayman,
1995; Nickerson, 1998; Wason, 1960). In con-
trast, the OED framework, which was inspired by
Bayesian norms of experiment design from statis-
tics (Horwich, 1982), has a number of successes
as a predictive theory and is gaining in popularity
among psychologists.
The origins and use of OED models. OED
methods were originally developed as statistical
tools to help researchers plan more informative sci-
entific experiments (Good, 1950; Fedorov, 1972;
Lindley, 1956). The idea is to create some formal
measure of the “goodness” of a particular experi-
ment with respect to the possible hypotheses that
the experimenter has in mind. Using this norma-
tive measure, researchers can then choose an ex-
periment that is most conducive to discriminating
among the possible hypotheses. This is an alterna-
tive to experiments that are intuitively designed by
researchers themselves but that might not be opti-
mally informative. For example, a cognitive scien-
tist studying human memory might choose differ-
ent delay intervals for a recall test following study.
Parameters like these are typically set using intu-
ition (e.g., to cover a broad range of values). An
OED method might instead output specific time
intervals that have the best chance to differenti-
ate competing theories (e.g., a power law or ex-
ponential forgetting function, see Myung & Pitt,
2009). The advantage of the OED method is that
seemingly arbitrary design choices are made based
on principled analyses of the researcher’s current
knowledge about possible hypotheses (or models).
Starting from a problem or situation that the ex-
perimenter (or human learner) is attempting to un-
derstand, most OED models are based on the fol-
lowing components (see below for more mathe-
matical detail):
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Figure 1. An overview of human inquiry from the perspective of OED theories. Such theories begin with
an ambiguous situation that provokes an inquiry goal. For example, the learner might wonder why the cat
is in a bag. In thinking about how to best obtain the answer the learner is assumed to consider alternative
hypotheses about the explanation. Next the learner evaluates possible actions or questions they could ask.
Such questions are evaluated largely on how informative the answers to the questions would be. Finally,
a question is chosen and the learner updates their belief based on the answer. OED theories capture the
information processing elements within the thought bubbles.
1. A set of hypotheses (e.g., statistical mod-
els or range of parameter values) the ex-
perimenter or learner wants to discriminate
among;
2. A set of experiments or questions that the ex-
perimenter or learner can choose from (e.g.,
parameters of a design or types of condi-
tions);
3. A model of the data that each experiment
or question could produce, given the experi-
menter’s current knowledge;
4. A measure of the value of these outcomes
with respect to the hypotheses (e.g., the dif-
ference in model likelihood, or confidence
about parameter values).
Together, these components enable a researcher
to compute an “expected value” of every possible
experiment, and choose the experiment that max-
imizes this value. This involves a preposterior
analysis (Raiffa & Schlaifer, 1961), during which
experimenters have to simulate the potential out-
comes of every experiment and compute how help-
ful each of these outcomes would be for achieving
their goal.
OED methods have been used by experimenters
to improve parameter estimation and model
comparison. For example, psychologists have
used them to discriminate different memory
models (Cavagnaro, Myung, Pitt, & Kujala, 2010;
Myung & Pitt, 2009), to compare models of
temporal discounting (Cavagnaro, Aranovich,
Mcclure, Pitt, & Myung, 2014), to improve
teaching tools for concept learning (Rafferty,
Zaharia, & Griffiths, 2014), to fit psychophysical
functions (Kim, Pitt, Lu, Steyvers, & Myung,
2014), and even to discriminate between different
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models of human inquiry (J. D. Nelson, McKenzie,
Cottrell, & Sejnowski, 2010).
Aside from scientific applications, OED con-
cepts are also widely used in machine learning
to develop algorithms that rely on active learn-
ing. Such algorithms have the capacity to self-
select their training data in order to learn more ef-
ficiently (Mackay, 1992; K. P. Murphy, 2001; Set-
tles, 2010). For example, they can decide when to
ask a human to provide a label of an unclassified
training instance (e.g., a document). Active learn-
ing is especially useful when it is costly or time-
consuming to obtain such corrective feedback.
OED modeling in psychology. Somewhat
separately from these applied domains, researchers
in psychology have used the OED formalism as
a theory or hypothesis about human inquiry
behavior. OED models have been used to explain
how young children ask questions or play with
an unfamiliar toy (Bonawitz et al., 2010; Cook,
Goodman, & Schulz, 2011; Gopnik, 2009; Mc-
Cormack, Bramley, Frosch, Patrick, & Lagnado,
2016; J. D. Nelson, Divjak, Gudmundsdottir,
Martignon, & Meder, 2014; Ruggeri & Lombrozo,
2015; Schulz, Gopnik, & Glymour, 2007), how
people ask about object names in order to help
them classify future objects (Markant & Gureckis,
2014; J. D. Nelson et al., 2010; J. D. Nelson,
Tenenbaum, & Movellan, 2001), and how people
plan interventions on causal systems to understand
how variables are causally related to one another
(Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015;
Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum,
2003). They can also model how learners would
search an environment to discover the position
of objects in space (Gureckis & Markant, 2009;
Markant & Gureckis, 2012), and where they would
move their eyes to maximize the information
learned about a visual scene (Najemnik & Geisler,
2005, 2009). Figure 1 illustrates how these basic
components of the OED framework might map
onto an everyday scenario facing a human learner.
What is common to all these approaches is the
claim that the mind operates, at least indirectly, to
optimize the amount of information available from
the environment just as OED methods optimize the
information value of experiments. It is the broad
application and success of this theory that makes it
both interesting and worthy of critical evaluation.
We will start our discussion of the OED framework
by laying out its principles in more mathematical
detail.
Formal specification of OED models
An OED model is a mathematical way to quan-
tify the expected value of a question, query, or ex-
periment for serving a learner’s goals. The basic
approach is related to expected utility models of
economic decision making, but uses utilities that
are informational in nature, rather than costs and
benefits of correct or incorrect decisions. Impor-
tantly, OED models are designed to not depend
on which hypotheses a researcher personally fa-
vors or dislikes. OED models define the expected
utility of a question as the average utility of that
question’s possible answers. Formally, a ques-
tion Q = {a1, a2, ...am} is a random variable with
possible answers a1, a2, ...am. The expected util-
ity of that question, EU(Q), is defined as the aver-
age utility that will be obtained once its answer is
known, i.e.: EU(Q) =
∑
a j∈Q P(Q = a j)U(Q = a j)
.
Utility can be any function that measures a
learner’s progress towards achieving their goal of
inquiry, which could be pure information gath-
ering, planning a choice, or making a judgment.
The learner’s goal is often to identify the correct
hypothesis. The possible hypotheses (or states
of the world) are defined by a random variable
H = h1, h2, ...hn. Many OED utility functions
are based on the prior and possible posterior
probabilities of each hypothesis h ∈ H, and on
how the distribution of probabilities would change
according to each possible answer that could be
obtained.
For concise notation in this paper, rather than
writing out both the random variable and the value
that it takes, we will specify the value that the ran-
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dom variable takes. For instance, suppose we wish
to denote the probability that a specific question Q,
if asked, would result the specific answer a. Rather
than writing P(Q = a), we will write P(a). It is
important to emphasize that a specific answer a is
associated with a specific question Q. Or suppose
we wish to denote the probability of a specific hy-
pothesis h, given that question Q has been asked
and that answer a has been obtained. Rather than
writing P(H = h|Q = a), we will simply write
P(h|a). Thus, the expected utility (usefulness) of a
question Q can be concisely written as
EU(Q) =
∑
a∈Q
P(a)U(a) (1)
A learner is typically faced with a set of possible
questions {Q}. (The curly braces denote that we
are referring to a set of questions, Q1,Q2,Q3, ...,
each of which is a random variable, rather than to
a specific single question.) To determine the op-
timal question, a learner has to calculate the ex-
pected utility of each possible individual question
by simulating the possible answers of each ques-
tion, calculating the usefulness of each answer, and
weighting each possible answer’s usefulness as in
Equation 1.
One of the most prominent OED usefulness
functions is the expected value of a learner’s
gain in information or reduction in uncer-
tainty (Austerweil & Griffiths, 2011; Cavagnaro
et al., 2010; Lindley, 1956; Najemnik & Geisler,
2005; J. D. Nelson et al., 2014; Oaksford &
Chater, 1994). A common metric of uncertainty
is Shannon entropy, although alternative ways of
measuring the value of an outcome will also be
discussed below. The information gain of a par-
ticular answer, a, to question Q, is the difference
between the prior and the posterior entropy:
UIG(a) = ent(H) − ent(H|a) (2)
The prior Shannon entropy is
ent(H) =
∑
h∈H
P(h)log
1
P(h)
= −
∑
h∈H
P(h)logP(h),
(3)
and the posterior entropy is
ent(H|a) =
∑
h∈H
P(h|a)log 1
P(h|a) = −
∑
h∈H
P(h|a)logP(h|a)
(4)
where the posterior probability of each particular
hypothesis h is derived using Bayes’ (1763) rule:
P(h|a) = P(h)P(a|h)/P(a). (5)
The combination of Equations (1) and (2) yields
the Expected Information Gain (EIG) of a query,
EUIG(Q).
How Psychologists Develop OED Models of In-
quiry
To illustrate how the key components of the
OED framework can be mapped onto different ex-
periment paradigms in psychology, consider the
list of examples in Table 1. What is impressive
about this list is the broad range of human behav-
iors that have been modeled by way of the OED
hypothesis. While this table gives a cursory im-
pression, in the following section we review in de-
tail three example studies that use OED to model
hypothesis testing, causal learning, and children’s
exploratory play. We particularly aim to highlight
what types of conclusions theorists have drawn
from their models and behavioral findings.
Example 1: Logical Hypothesis Testing. In
the most well-known psychological application
of OED, Oaksford and Chater (1994) revisit the
classic Wason card selection experiment (Wason,
1966). The experiment tests whether people are
able to logically test hypotheses by falsifying
them, that is, by checking that there are no counter
examples to a logical rule. Participants are asked
to test for a simple conditional rule involving a
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Table 1
How the main OED components map onto particular research topics in psychology.
Examples Inquiry Goal Hypotheses (H) Queries (Q) Answers (a)
Causal Learning
Bramley, Lagnado, &
Speekenbrink, 2015;
Steyvers et al., 2003;
Coenen, Rehder, &
Gureckis, 2015
What is the structural pat-
tern of how different vari-
ables in a system influence
one another?
Causal models that relate
the variables of the sys-
tem in different ways (e.g.,
causal Bayes nets).
Setting the value of one or
more variables through an
intervention.
The effects of making an
intervention on the causal
system.
Categorization
Markant & Gureckis,
2014; Markant, Settles,
& Gureckis, 2015;
J. D. Nelson et al., 2010
What types of shapes are
called “daxes”?
Rules about category
membership (e.g., “all red
things are daxes”).
Different category mem-
bers or objects to test.
The category membership
of the queried item.
Spatial Search
Gureckis & Markant, 2009;
Markant & Gureckis, 2012;
Rothe, Lake, & Gureckis,
2016
What is the hidden spatial
pattern?
Different hypotheses about
the identity of hidden pat-
terns.
Tiles to turn over in a
game or verbal questions
that can be asked about the
pattern.
The color of a hidden tile
or information about the
pattern.
Eye movements
Najemnik & Geisler, 2005
Where should I move my
eyes next to search for a
target?
Possible target locations
within the visual field.
Locations to move the
eyes.
What is visible as a partic-
ular location.
Rule learning
Wason, 1960; Klayman &
Ha, 1989; J. D. Nelson et al.,
2001
What rule determines if a
sequence numbers is valid
or invalid?
A rule about number se-
quences (e.g., “odd, in-
creasing numbers”).
Different sequences of
numbers (e.g., “’2-4-6’).
Valid or invalid according
to the rule.
Twenty Questions
J. D. Nelson et al., 2014;
Ruggeri & Lombrozo, 2015;
Mosher & Hornsby, 1966
What object does the an-
swerer have in mind?
All possible objects, ani-
mals, or people.
Features of the object
(e.g., “is it blue?’).
Yes or No.
Logical Reasoning
Wason, 1966; Oaksford &
Chater, 1994
Find out if cards with vow-
els have even numbers on
the other side.
Vowels always predict
even numbers or the two
are independent.
Turn over cards with a
vowel, consonant, odd, or
even number.
Symbol on the other side
of the card.
set of four cards. The four cards are labeled “A”,
“K”, “2”, or “7” and participants are asked to test
if “cards with a vowel on one side have an even
number on the other side” (a rule of the form, if p,
then q). The dependent measure is which of the
four cards participants turn over. (Participants are
allowed to select all, none, or any subset of the
four cards.) An often-replicated pattern of results
is that most people select the “A” (p) card, many
choose the “2” (q) card and few choose the “7”
(not-q) card. This pattern of preferences violates
the logical norms, which dictate that one needs to
test “A” (p) and “7” (not-q), but not “2” (q). The
“7” card (not-q) card is crucial, because it could
potentially be a counterexample if it had a vowel
on the other side.
To explain the discrepancy between people’s
choices and reasoning norms, Oaksford and Chater
(1994) interpret the task as a problem of induc-
tive inference (how does a learner anticipate to
change their beliefs based on data), rather than as
checking for violation of a logical rule. Oaksford
and Chater propose that people choose queries
to reduce their uncertainty about two hypotheses:
The dependence hypothesis specifies that the
logical rule holds perfectly. The independence
hypothesis specifies that the letters (A vs K) are
assigned independently of the numbers (2 and
3) on the other side of the cards. Oaksford and
Chater compute the expected information gain
(see Equation 2 above) for each query (card). The
model assigns values to different queries (each
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of the four cards that can be turned over) and
considers possible outcomes from these queries
(observing a vowel, consonant, even number, or
odd number). In the model, Oaksford and Chater
further assume that the “A” and the “2” are rare,
that is, learners do not expect many cards to have
either vowels or even numbers on them. Given
these assumptions, it turns out that the expected
information gain from testing “2” is actually
greater than that of testing “7”, which matches the
pattern of behavior often found in this task.
In this article, Oaksford and Chater (1994) ap-
ply OED methods as part of a rational analysis
of the card selection task (Anderson, 1990) that
uses an optimal model to capture people’s behav-
ior given some additional assumptions, but with-
out any commitment to a particular set of cogni-
tive processes that underlie this behavior. Regard-
ing the actual implementation of the computation,
the authors note that “The reason that people con-
form to our analysis of the selection task might be
due to innate constraints or learning, rather than
sophisticated probabilistic calculation.” (Oaksford
& Chater, 1994, p. 628). This is an example of
a successful OED analysis that does not involve
any algorithmic or implementational claim. Oaks-
ford and Chater’s model also illustrates how re-
searchers in the rational analysis framework have
often adopted assumptions that make human be-
havior seem reasonable, rather than looking for
deviations from a particular set of logic- or other
norm-based assumptions of how people should be-
have.
Example 2: Causal Learning. Another type
of inquiry that has been modeled with OED norms
is causal intervention learning. Steyvers et al.
(2003) used expected information gain to predict
which variables participants would manipulate to
figure out the underlying causal relationships. In
their experiment, participants first spent some time
passively observing the behavior of a causal net-
work of mind-reading aliens. The aliens’ thoughts
were depicted as strings of letters appearing over
their heads. Participants were told to figure out
which aliens could read which other aliens’ minds
(which resulted in them thinking the same thought
as the one they were reading from). After the ob-
servation phase, participants gave an initial guess
about how they thought the aliens were causally
connected. Then, they were asked to make an in-
tervention by inserting a thought into one of the
aliens’ heads and observing the thoughts of the
other aliens.
Again, the authors modeled these choices using
an OED model based on expected information
gain, which aims to reduce the uncertainty about
possible causal structure hypotheses. Here, queries
corresponded to the different aliens that could have
a thought inserted, and outcomes corresponded
to all possible ways in which the other aliens
could change their thoughts as a consequence.
The hypothesis space contained possible causal
structures that described how the aliens were
connected (i.e., who could read whose mind). The
authors considered a number of implementations
of the OED model that differed with respect to the
space of hypotheses. An unconstrained version
of the model, which considered all possible
causal structures connecting the aliens, was not
a good fit to people’s choices. However, a more
constrained version, which assumed that people
were only comparing their top hypothesis to its
own subgraphs (i.e., graphs containing a subset
of the edges of the most likely graph) and an
unconnected graph, fit the human data well.
The authors concluded that “people bring to bear
inferential techniques not so different from those
common in scientific practice... they choose tar-
gets that can be expected to provide the most diag-
nostic test of the hypotheses they initially formed
through passive observation.” (Steyvers et al.,
2003, p. 486). Unlike the previous example, this
conclusion suggests that people actually imple-
ment the underlying computations associated with
the OED model. This interpretation is also com-
mon in work on OED models of inquiry.
Example 3: Exploratory Play. Finally, con-
sider an example from the developmental litera-
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ture on children’s capacities for inquiry. Cook
et al. (2011) gave preschoolers different informa-
tion about the causal properties of toys (beads)
and examined their subsequent behavior during ex-
ploratory play. Children were either shown that all
beads were causally effective (they could turn on a
machine and make it play music) or that only some
beads are effective (some could not turn on the ma-
chine). Subsequently, children were given a new
set of two beads that were attached to each other.
Children who had learned that only some beads are
effective proceeded to take apart the two new beads
and test them with the machine individually. By
contrast, children who had previously learned that
all beads worked rarely bothered to check the new
beads individually.
This behavior can also be modeled with ex-
pected information gain, by assuming that learn-
ers are choosing between three possible queries
(testing both beads, testing the first bead, and test-
ing the second bead) and anticipating one of two
outcomes (the machine turning on or not). The
experimenter’s demonstration is designed to set
children’s hypotheses about the new pair of con-
nected beads. Children in the all-beads-work con-
dition only have a single hypothesis (both beads
work), while those in the some-beads-work con-
dition have four (both work, one works, the other
works, neither works). To reduce their uncertainty
about these hypotheses, the model predicts that the
beads must be tested in isolation, which matches
the behavioral data.
This example illustrates a trend in the develop-
mental literature to draw analogies between chil-
dren and scientists. Without making concrete al-
gorithmic claims, Cook et al. (2011) interpret their
findings as evidence that even young children opti-
mize information gain during inquiry in a scientific
manner, and conclude that “these results tighten
the analogy to science that has motivated contem-
porary theories of cognitive development” (Cook
et al., 2011, p. 348).
These three examples illustrate not only dif-
ferent psychological applications of OED models
but also the different types of explanatory claims
that OED analyses have supported, ranging from
the computational-level observation that people
behave as if they optimize informational value
(in Oaksford & Chater, 1994) to the more am-
bitious idea that people, like scientists, actually
implement OED computational principles to some
degree (in Steyvers et al., 2003). Although the
actual explanatory claims may vary significantly
from study to study, a common thread remains
the tight analogy between empirical science and
human information-seeking.
It should be noted that the history of psychology
also offers examples of researchers using the
OED framework to support the opposite claim
that human information-seeking does not follow
rational and scientific principles. For example,
some studies in the heuristics and biases tra-
dition (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982)
highlighted ways in which human judgments
deviate from OED norms (Baron, Beattie, & Her-
shey, 1988; Skov & Sherman, 1986; Slowiaczek,
Klayman, Sherman, & Skov, 1992). Similarly,
prior to the Bayesian approach used by Oaksford
and Chater (1996), research on logical rule learn-
ing showed many discrepancies between OED
principles and human behavior (Klayman & Ha,
1987; Klayman, 1995; Wason, 1960). Despite this
history, the people-as-scientists metaphor has by
far outweighed these account in recent years.
Merits of the OED hypothesis
The OED approach has greatly contributed to
the study of human inquiry. Perhaps most saliently,
it has provided a computationally precise approach
to some very open-ended aspects of human behav-
ior. In addition, the OED hypothesis provides a
theoretical account of diverse information-seeking
behaviors, ranging from visual search to question
asking. In doing so, it also builds a theoretical
bridge to models of a wide array of other cog-
nitive processes, which, on the surface, bear lit-
tle or no resemblance to information search. For
example, Information Gain and related principles
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have been used in models of receptive proper-
ties of visual neurons (Ruderman, 1994; Ullman,
Vidal-Naquet, & Sali, 2002) and auditory neu-
rons (Lewicki, 2002). They are also key compo-
nents of recent models of visual saliency, which
predict human eye movements as a function of im-
age properties (Borji & Itti, 2013; Itti & Baldi,
2005, 2006; Zhang, Tong, Marks, Shan, & Cot-
trell, 2008). They also connect to Friston and col-
leagues’ (e.g., 2009; 2017) free energy principles,
which posit that all neuronal activity is aimed at
minimizing uncertainty (or maximizing informa-
tion).
Finally, the close connections between OED
models in psychology and formal methods in
mathematics, physics, statistics, and epistemology
make it straightforward for psychological theory
to benefit from advancements in those areas.
For example, research in computer science on
computationally efficient active learning machines
has inspired new theoretical approaches to inquiry
behavior in humans (Markant et al., 2015; Rothe
et al., 2016).
Limitations of the OED hypothesis
Despite its successes, this article critically ex-
amines some of the basic elements of the OED re-
search approach. Our critique springs from two
main points, which, at first glance, may seem con-
tradictory. On the one hand, applications of the
OED framework in psychology often rely on a
wealth of non-trivial assumptions about a learner’s
cognitive capacities and goals. There is a risk
that this makes the models too flexible to gener-
ate testable predictions. On the other hand, we
will argue that the framework is in some cases not
rich enough to capture the broad types of inquiry
behavior exhibited by humans. These later cases
are particularly important because, as OED gains
in popularity as a theoretical framework, there is
a risk that important aspects of behavior are being
overlooked.
Elaborating on the first point, the three example
studies reviewed above demonstrate a frequent re-
search approach that is shared by many applica-
tions of the OED hypothesis within psychology.
First, it is assumed that people inquire about the
world around them in order to maximize gain in
knowledge. Second, this assumption is instanti-
ated as a specific OED model which assigns values
to different questions, queries, or actions in a par-
ticular task. Finally, additional assumptions about
cognitive processes (hypotheses, priors, etc.) may
be added to the model to improve its fit.
Importantly, this research strategy does not set
out to directly test the core claims of the OED hy-
pothesis. For some researchers the framework pro-
vides a set of starting assumptions and novel psy-
chological insights are more likely to emerge from
modifications of a model’s peripheral components
that get adjusted in the light of behavioral data. For
instance, in Oaksford and Chater’s (1994) analy-
sis of the card selection task the model fits behav-
ior under the assumption that events (p and q) oc-
cur rarely. Similarly, Steyvers et al.’s (2003) best-
fitting rational test model relies on a very restricted
space of causal graph hypotheses. It is common for
OED models to rely on very specific assumptions,
but less common for researchers to treat these as-
sumptions as discoveries in their own right. The
rarity prior in Oaksford and Chater (1994) is an
exception in this respect and provides a good ex-
ample of integration between OED models and
their assumptions. The rarity assumption is impli-
cated in other hypothesis testing research, has nor-
mative support from the Bayesian literature, and
it has generated a number of follow-up studies
that systematically manipulate it and find that be-
havior changes accordingly (McKenzie, Ferreira,
Mikkelsen, McDermott, & Skrable, 2001; Oaks-
ford & Chater, 1996; Oaksford, Chater, Grainger,
& Larkin, 1997). In general, however, it is rare
for OED applications to examine and justify their
auxiliary assumptions in such detail.
This general lack of integration between a for-
mal framework and its assumptions about requi-
site cognitive components is a common criticism
leveled against other classes of models, particu-
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larly Bayesian approaches for modeling higher-
level cognition (Jones & Love, 2011; Marcus &
Davis, 2013). Importantly, as both critics and de-
fenders of Bayesian models have pointed out (see
peer commentary on Jones & Love, 2011), this
kind of criticism does not require rejecting the en-
tire framework, but can be addressed by promoting
greater efforts towards theory integration at differ-
ent levels of explanation (e.g., computational, al-
gorithmic, and ecological). The same holds for
OED models of inquiry. Many of the current lim-
itations of the framework could be overcome by
moving beyond the mere metaphor of people as
intuitive scientists and beginning to take the role
of auxiliary assumptions seriously. This is the ap-
proach we advocate in some parts of this paper.
On the second point, there are also ways in
which using the OED hypothesis as a starting as-
sumption limits the kinds of behavior studied in
the field. Recall that to make an inquiry problem
amenable to an OED analysis, a researcher must
quantify the set of hypotheses a learner consid-
ers, their prior beliefs over these hypotheses, the
set of possible queries available to them, and their
probability model for the outcome of each query.
As we will note throughout this paper, there are
many kinds of inquiry behaviors that would be
difficult or impossible to express in those model
terms, either because they are not based on the
same components (e.g., inquiry in the absence of
well-defined hypotheses), because of the compu-
tational complexity of applying OED, or because
we do not yet know how to specify them computa-
tionally as part of a model (e.g., query types with
computationally complex outcomes). Of course,
no psychological theory is able to capture every
single interesting cognitive phenomenon in a broad
area like inquiry. However, we believe that it is im-
portant to pay close attention to the kinds of limits
a theory imposes and make sure they do not lead to
an overly narrow focus on a small set of questions
that happen to be amenable to a particular analysis.
Our review highlights the challenges of capturing
important inquiry behaviors with OED and aims to
encourage future research in these directions. We
also highlight a number of questions that fall en-
tirely outside of the purview of OED analyses, but
that we believe deserve more attention in the study
of human inquiry.
Nine Questions about Questioning
In the following sections we address what we
think are some of the most interesting unresolved
psychological questions about human inquiry. The
criticism is built around the following nine ques-
tions about human inquiry:
1. How do people construct a set of hypothe-
ses?
2. How do people generate a set of candidate
queries?
3. What makes a “good” answer?
4. How do people generate and weight possible
answers to their queries?
5. How does learning from answers affect
query selection?
6. How do cognitive constraints influence in-
quiry strategies?
7. What triggers inquiry behaviors in the first
place?
8. How does inquiry-driven learning influence
what we learn?
9. What is the developmental trajectory of in-
quiry abilities?
Each section is designed to operate somewhat
independently so readers are encouraged to read
this article in a nonlinear fashion. In addition,
at the beginning of certain sections that deal with
variables or terms in the standard OED equations
(i.e., Equations 1-5), we reprint the relevant equa-
tion and highlight the particular component of the
OED framework that is discussed.
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Question 1: How do people construct the space
of hypotheses?
A crucial foundation for being able to use an
OED model is the set of hypotheses or hypothe-
sis space, H, that a learner considers. One reason
is that the most common measure of information
quality (Information Gain, Equation 4) depends on
changes in the entropy over the space of possible
hypotheses:
ent(H|a) = −
∑
h ∈ H
What
is in
H?
P(h|a)logP(h|a)
The genesis of hypothesis spaces and priors in
models of cognition is an issue that has been
raised with respect to Bayesian models of cog-
nition (Goodman, Frank, Griffiths, & Tenen-
baum, 2015; Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, &
Tenenbaum, 2010; Jones & Love, 2011; Marcus
& Davis, 2013), but plays out in particularly
interesting ways in the OED framework.
What is a hypothesis or hypothesis space?
Hypotheses often are thought of as reflecting
different possibilities about the true state of
the world (related to possible world semantics,
Ginsberg & Smith, 1988). Hypothesis sets may
contain discrete objects (like causal structures,
category partitions, or even dynamic physics
models, Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013).
Alternatively, a hypothesis space might reflect
a distribution over continuous quantities (e.g.,
locations in space), or model parameters. The
examples in this article often focus on discrete
cases, since they tend to be more commonly
used in OED models of higher-level cognition.
However, the issues we raise also apply to some
continuous hypothesis spaces.
How do current psychological applications of
OED models define this hypothesis space? If the
domain of inquiry is sufficiently well-defined,
modelers often assume that learners consider an
exhaustive set of hypotheses. For example, in
categorization tasks the full set includes every
possible partition of the space of objects into
categories (Anderson, 1991; Markant & Gureckis,
2014; Meder & Nelson, 2012; J. D. Nelson, 2005).
In causal learning scenarios, the hypotheses might
be all possible (direct and acyclical) graphs (or
possible parameterizations of graphs) that might
explain the causal relationships between a number
of variables (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink,
2015; K. P. Murphy, 2001; Steyvers et al., 2003).
In a spatial search task, the hypothesis set could
consist of all possible locations and orientations of
an object (Markant & Gureckis, 2012; Najemnik
& Geisler, 2005). This exhaustive approach can
lead to the following three problems.
First, fully enumerated hypothesis spaces can be
very large and complex, even in relatively simple
tasks with a well-defined structure. For example,
the number of possible partitions of objects into
categories grows exponentially with the number of
objects (Anderson, 1991; Berge, 1971). Similarly,
the number of possible causal graph hypotheses
increases rapidly with each additional variable (2
variables yield 3, 3 variables 25, 4 variables 543,
and 5 variables 29281 possibilities). In real world
situations, the number of candidate category mem-
bers and potential causal variables often far ex-
ceeds the situations used in psychological exper-
iments, exacerbating the issue.
Given limited cognitive capacities, it seems
unlikely that people can consider hundreds or
thousands of discrete hypotheses and update their
relative plausibility with every new piece of data.
In fact, empirical studies often find that people ap-
pear to consider only a limited number of hypothe-
ses in probabilistic reasoning tasks (Dougherty
& Hunter, 2003b). Hypothesis set size in some
tasks also scales with working memory capacity
(Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a), which suggests
that cognitive load could influence hypothesis
set size. Some studies even argue that people
consider only one hypothesis at a time in various
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learning and decision-making tasks (Bramley,
Dayan, & Lagnado, 2015; Courville & Daw,
2007; Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010; Vul,
Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2014).
Another conceptual problem is that hypothesis
sets are not always easy to define from the per-
spective of the modeler. Although it is sometimes
obvious what belongs in a hypothesis set for a par-
ticular task, there are many cases in which it this
is much less clear. For example, imagine a child
shaking a new toy for the first time. What should
we assume about her hypotheses, given that she
has never seen a toy like this before? And how
should she reduce her uncertainty about these hy-
potheses as efficiently as possible? Of course, it
is possible that, based on prior experience with
other toys, she is testing some high-level possi-
bilities, for example whether or not the toy makes
any noise when shaken. However, it is also possi-
ble that she chooses actions in line with more low-
level principles of reducing prediction error about
the outcome of her own motor actions. In that
case, her hypothesis space might consist of a gen-
erative model that links actions, world states and
percepts, and that can be used to quantify the ex-
pected surprise associated with self-generated ac-
tions (for such a general formulation of action as
active inference, see Friston, 2009). Alternatively,
the best model of this kind of behavior might not
involve any hypotheses. Instead, the child’s behav-
ior might be the outcome of some internal drive to
explore and act on the world that is independent
of particular beliefs or goals (Hoch, Rachwani, &
Adolph, in review).
Confronting these conceptual and practical
challenges is critical for models of inquiry. Here
we address three possible approaches that have
been used in recent research and discuss the
merits of each. They include restricting hypoth-
esis spaces, focusing on single hypotheses, and
forming queries with no hypotheses whatsoever.
Curtailed hypothesis spaces. One solution to
the combinatorial explosion of hypotheses is to se-
lect only a few hypotheses at a time and try to be-
have optimally given this subset. This is viable
when it is possible to enumerate all hypotheses in
principle, but the complexity of the full space is
large and cognitive limitations forbid considering
the whole set.
There is some evidence that people consider
such pared down sets of hypotheses when seeking
information. For example, Steyvers and col-
leagues’ (2003) causal intervention study, the
best-fitting OED model was one that restricted
the hypothesis set to a single working hypothesis
(causal graph), as well as its “subgraphs” and a
null model in which all variables were indepen-
dent. Oaksford and Chater (1994) made a similar
modeling assumption by considering only two
possibilities about the world, one in which the
conditional if p then q holds, and one in which p
and q are entirely independent. However, there are
many other logical relationships that could exist
between them (e.g., the inverse conditional or a
bi-conditional).
If some reduction of a hypothesis space provides
a better account of human inquiry, an interesting
question for the field becomes how to develop the-
ories of this process. One approach is to model
more directly the processes that might be used to
construct a hypothesis set. Currently there are few
such algorithmic theories, with the exception of
a model called HyGene (Dougherty, Thomas, &
Lange, 2010; Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, &
Harbison, 2008). When encountering new data,
HyGene generates hypotheses that have served as
explanation for similar types of data in the past.
Past data is retrieved from memory based on its
similarity to the current data, and working memory
capacity places an upper bound on the number of
retrieved items. This subset of hypotheses is then
evaluated with respect to the current data, and in-
consistent hypotheses are ruled out. Since hypoth-
esis generation in HyGene is based on memory re-
trieval processes, this approach would be particu-
larly useful for modeling inquiry in domains where
learners have a certain degree of prior knowledge
(e.g., clinicians diagnosing diseases).
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Alternatively, hypothesis spaces may be con-
structed on the basis of other processes. For ex-
ample, comparison has been shown to promote re-
lational abstraction, which in some cases might
help bootstrap new types of hypotheses (Christie
& Genter, 2010). According to this idea, com-
parison between two objects invokes a process of
structural alignment where different features and
relations of the objects are brought into corre-
spondence with one another. In doing so, com-
parison has been shown to help focus people on
shared relational structure, making these common-
alities more salient for subsequent processing (e.g.,
similarity judgments). Thus, comparison might
also help alter the hypothesis space considered for
inquiry behaviors, by highlighting relational fea-
tures.
One approach to formalize curtailed hypothesis
generation comes from rational process mod-
els (also often simply referred to as sampling
algorithms, see Bonawitz, Denison, Griffiths, &
Gopnik, 2014; Courville & Daw, 2007; Denison,
Bonawitz, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2013; Gershman,
Vul, & Tenenbaum, 2012; Sanborn et al., 2010;
Vul et al., 2014). These models explain how a
computationally limited organism can approxi-
mate Bayesian inference by making simplifying
assumptions about how hypotheses are maintained
and updated. Instead of representing the complete
posterior probability distribution over possible
hypotheses, the idea is that learners sample
from this distribution, and thus only maintain a
subset of hypotheses at any point in time. One
feature of these models is that they can account
for sequential dependencies during learning.
For example, under certain parameterizations
particle filter models yield hypotheses that are
“sticky”, that is, that once considered will be
maintained and only dropped when a learner
encounters strong conflicting evidence (related
to win-stay-lose-shift models of belief updating,
Bonawitz, Denison, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2014).
This stickiness property matches human learning
data in some tasks and is therefore considered an
advantage of rational process models over “purely
rational” models of hypothesis generation and
belief updating (Bonawitz, Denison, Gopnik, &
Griffiths, 2014; Bramley, Dayan, & Lagnado,
2015; Brown & Steyvers, 2009).
However, current sampling models lack a ro-
bust coupling of model terms and psychological
processes. For example, it is unclear how the
(re-)sampling of new hypotheses from the cur-
rent posterior might be implemented. A promis-
ing direction is to integrate ideas from algorith-
mic models like HyGene that ground similar com-
putations in mechanistic accounts of memory re-
trieval (Gershman & Daw, 2017; Shi, Griffiths,
Feldman, & Sanborn, 2010).
Rational process models face another challenge.
Much of their appeal is based on the fact that, un-
der certain limiting conditions, they converge to-
ward the true Bayesian posterior. Consequently,
many have argued that they might bridge between
optimal analyses and mechanistic accounts of be-
havior (Bonawitz, Denison, Griffiths, & Gopnik,
2014; Brown & Steyvers, 2009; Jones & Love,
2011; Sanborn et al., 2010). In reality, however,
many of these algorithms require hundreds or thou-
sands of samples in order to converge. Cognitive
psychologists, on the other hand, often find that
humans use considerably fewer samples, even as
few as one (Vul et al., 2014), possibly because
sampling incurs cognitive or metabolic costs. One
skeptical interpretation of this work is that it im-
plies that Bayesian inference is too costly for the
brain. Also, if people sample stochastically, it
should be rare that any single person acts opti-
mally during inquiry (S. Y. Chen, Ross, & Mur-
phy, 2014). Instead, these theories predict that
people will be optimal or unbiased on average
(across people or situations). This property of sam-
pling models, if correct, would suggest significant
changes to the way OED models are evaluated. For
instance, researchers would need to start quantify-
ing optimality at a group level rather than for indi-
viduals (e.g., Mozer, Pashler, & Homaei, 2008) or
based on data from repeatedly testing a participant
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on the same task. This may require larger experi-
mental populations and new experiment designs.
Single-hypothesis queries. One common
finding is that learners seem to seek information
for a single hypothesis at a time. Although this
can be seen as just a special (most extreme) case
of curtailing hypothesis sets, single-hypothesis
queries have rather unique characteristics and have
motivated countless psychological experiments
and models. Since OED models so fundamentally
rely on a process of discrimination between
competing hypotheses (see Figure 1), single-
hypothesis queries have been particularly difficult
to explain.
For example, in Wason’s (1960) “2-4-6” task,
participants are asked to find out which numeric
rule the experimenter is using, knowing only that
the sequence “2-4-6” satisfies this rule. In this task,
many participants immediately generate the work-
ing hypothesis that the rule is “even numbers in-
creasing by 2” and proceed to test this rule with
more positive examples, like “4-6-8” (Klayman &
Ha, 1989; Wason, 1960). This has been called
a positive testing strategy (PTS). Because it can
yield suboptimal behaviors, it is also cited as an
example of confirmation bias, that is, the tendency
to verify one’s current beliefs instead of seeking
and considering conflicting evidence (Klayman &
Ha, 1987, 1989; Nickerson, 1998).
Single hypothesis use and the failure to consider
alternatives have been observed in many areas
of cognition besides information search. For
example, during sequential learning people often
only maintain a single hypothesis, which gets
adapted with new evidence over time (Bramley,
Dayan, & Lagnado, 2015; Gregg & Simon,
1967; Markant & Gureckis, 2014; Nosofsky
& Palmeri, 1998; Trueswell, Medina, Hafri, &
Gleitman, 2013). When dealing with objects
that have uncertain category membership, people
often base their inference on the most likely
category, ignoring its alternative(s) (Malt, Ross,
& Murphy, 1995; G. L. Murphy, Chen, & Ross,
2012; Ross & Murphy, 1996). During causal
reasoning, people frequently make predictions
based on single causes and neglect the possibility
of alternatives (Fernbach, Darlow, & Sloman,
2010, 2011; Hayes, Hawkins, & Newell, 2015).
The ubiquity of single hypothesis reasoning is
not easily reconciled with the metaphor that peo-
ple act like intuitive scientists, even after conced-
ing that they are subject to cognitive limitations.
Since model discrimination lies at the heart of the
metaphor, it seems difficult to argue that single-
hypothesis queries are the output of an optimal
learner in the OED sense. However, it turns out
that the PTS maximizes information under certain
assumptions. For example, the PTS is optimal (in
the OED sense) when hypotheses only have few
positive instances, when instances only occur un-
der a single hypothesis (during rule learning or cat-
egorization, see Navarro & Perfors, 2011; Oaks-
ford & Chater, 1994; Thomas et al., 2008), or
when hypotheses are deterministic (when predict-
ing sequences; see Austerweil & Griffiths, 2011).
Although this explanation cannot explain away all
cases of single-hypothesis inquiry, it does raise the
intriguing question of whether these factors actu-
ally influence whether people generate alternative
hypotheses. For example, Hendrickson, Navarro,
and Perfors (2016) manipulated the number of pos-
itive instances of a hypothesis and found that par-
ticipants behaved in a less confirmatory fashion as
hypothesis size increased. Similarly, Oaksford et
al. (1997) manipulated people’s beliefs about the
frequency of features associated with a hypothe-
sis in the Wason card selection task (for example,
participants were told that p and q both occurred
often). People were more likely to try to falsify the
rule when both features were common. These find-
ings highlight how a learner’s prior beliefs about
the structure of their environment impacts the hy-
potheses they generate, and the kinds of evidence
they seek to test them (see also Coenen, Bramley,
Ruggeri, & Gureckis, 2017).
Zero-hypotheses queries. The assumption
that people make queries to test specific hypothe-
ses is central to OED models of cognition. Yet
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many reasonable questions do not require any
hypotheses at all. For example, upon visiting a
city for the first time, you may ask your local
friend “Where’s a good place to eat?”. This is an
incredibly common kind of query that does not
require considering any hypotheses beforehand.
Another example of zero-hypothesis information
gathering occurs in early childhood, when children
exhibit unstructured, exploratory play (e.g., Hoch,
Rachwani, & Adolph, in review). Although un-
certainty about many aspects of their environment
is presumably high, it is difficult to imagine that
young children always represent hypotheses about
what might happen as a consequence of their
information seeking behaviors. These examples
raise the question of how it is possible for a learner
to quantify their uncertainty or notice a knowledge
gap without hypotheses. We provide an in-depth
discussion of constraints on zero-hypothesis
queries in the next section that addresses how
people generate questions in the first place.
Summary. A critical challenge for OED mod-
els is to explain the set of hypotheses that the
learner considers. Although there is some recent
work exploring how people reason with subsets
of hypotheses, core psychological principles guid-
ing this process have remained elusive and choices
are sometimes made after experimental data have
been collected. In addition, the OED framework
does not easily apply to situations where learners
1.) consider the wrong hypotheses for the task, 2.)
consider only one hypothesis, or 3.) do not con-
sider hypotheses at all. These are not insurmount-
able challenges to the OED research program, es-
pecially in light of recent ideas about adaptive hy-
pothesis sampling or online hypothesis space con-
struction (Christie & Genter, 2010). However,
these issues are critical to establishing the broader
utility of the OED approach, outside of simple ex-
perimental tasks.
Question 2: How do people generate a set of
candidate queries?
In standard use, an OED modeler computes the
utility or informativeness of each possible query
available in the task and the asks if people select
the best option. For example, this could be which
cards to turn over in the Wason selection task (see
above) or where to fixate one’s eyes in a visual
search task. However, what comprises the set of
possible queries, {Q} = Q1,Q2, ..., that are avail-
able in any situation?
EU(
What
is in
{Q}?
Q ) =
∑
a∈Q
P(a)U(a)
Consider, for instance, a young child asking a
parent, “Can ducks fly?” Perhaps this is an in-
formative question for the current situation, but
there seems no limit to the number of questions
that could be asked (e.g., “Do ducks sleep?”, “How
many babies do ducks have?”, “Is the weight of a
duck in kilograms less than ten times the square
root of seven?”), even though only a subset might
be relevant for any particular inferential goal. In
order for OED principles to apply to this fairly
typical situation, every possible question or query
would need to be evaluated and compared to oth-
ers. OED models currently provide no guidance
on this process, ignoring almost completely how
the set of questions or queries is constructed.
For OED to be applied to more general types of
inquiry (such as asking questions using language),
the framework must be able deal with the wide
range of human questions. As we will argue below,
the existing OED literature has tended to focus on
relatively simple inquiry behaviors (e.g., turning
over cards in a game, asking the category label
of an object), which are more amenable to math-
ematical analysis. However, once one considers
modeling the rich and sophisticated set of ques-
tions people can ask using natural language, com-
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putational issues become a significant challenge.
Although this section focuses on question asking
in natural language, the concern is not limited to
the language domain. For example, interacting
with a complex system (like the physical world)
often requires us to construct novel actions or in-
terventions (Bramley, Gerstenberg, & Tenenbaum,
2016) from a potentially unbounded space. When
playing a new video game, for instance, a per-
son might initially perform a wide range of com-
plex actions to understand the game dynamics and
physics. Each action sequence reveals information
about the underlying system’s rules but is selected
from a potentially large space of possible action
sequences.
Searching for the right question. Many
researchers have had the experience of sitting
through the question portion of a talk and hearing
a very clever question asked by an attendee. Often,
we would not think to ask that question ourselves,
but we immediately recognize it as informative
and insightful. While in some cases we might
attribute this to differences in knowledge (e.g.,
perhaps a colleague thinks about an analysis in
a slightly different way) it also seems clear that
coming up with a question is often a significant
intellectual puzzle (Miyake & Norman, 1979).
Consider a recent study by Rothe et al. (2016).
In Experiment 1 of the paper, participants played
a game where they had to discover the shape and
configuration of a set of hidden ships on a game-
board (similar to the children’s game Battleship).
Rather than playing an entire game, participants
were presented with partially uncovered game-
boards (i.e., some of the tiles were uncovered, see
Figure 2) and then were given the opportunity to
ask questions in natural language, which would
be helpful for learning the true configuration of
this gameboard (the only limitations were that
questions had to be answerable with a single
word and that multiple questions could not be
combined). Example questions are “Where is the
upper right corner of the blue object?”, “How
long is the yellow object?”, or “How many tiles
are not occupied by ships?”. Interestingly, while
participants generated a wide variety of different
questions, they rarely came up with questions that
came even close to the highest expected infor-
mation gain (EIG). This is somewhat surprising,
because one assumption of the OED framework is
that people will ask the most informative question
in a given context. Given the simple setup of the
task, this should be the same question for each
participant in this game. Yet few subjects asked
really clever and revealing questions. The modal
participant asked much more mundane and only
moderately informative questions.
Interestingly, although participants were not
good at devising useful questions, they were
highly skilled at recognizing good questions.
In a follow-up experiment, participants were
presented with the same set of ambiguous game
situations and a list of potential questions derived
from the questions asked in the previous study.
Here people’s selections closely mirrored the
predictions of OED models with people preferring
the objectively most informative questions.
The Rothe et al. (2016) study highlights how the
demands of generating questions “from scratch”
may limit optimal information-seeking behavior.
In general, this work helps to clarify the distinction
between question generation and question eval-
uation (the latter being the primary emphasis of
contemporary OED approaches). One future re-
search topic raised by this work is how people
formulate questions in a given context and how
they search the large space of possible questions.
While presently underexplored, these topics have
natural solutions in computational or algorithmic
approaches. For example, Rothe et al. (in prep)
develop a question generating model that creates
the semantic equivalents to human questions us-
ing a context-free grammar. This approach de-
fines the basic semantic primitives of questions and
rules for the composition of these primitives, then
uses OED models as an objective function of a
search process that explores the space of expres-
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Figure 2. Top: Example of the Battleship game. Hidden gameboards are created by randomly selecting
ships of different sizes and orientations and placing them in a grid at random, non-overlapping locations.
A context is defined as a partially unveiled gameboard (center). The goal of the learner is to identify
the true gameboard by asking questions. Bottom: Task sequence from Rothe, Lake, & Gureckis (2016).
Subjects first turned over individual tiles one by one following instructions of experimenter (clicking on
the ?). Next they indicate the possible ship locations. Finally people asked whatever question they wanted
in natural language in order to best discover the underlying gameboard.
sions within the grammar to find the optimal ques-
tion.
An alternative approach would be to construct
questions “bottom-up” from the current situation.
For example, questions could be constructed
around hypothetical propositions or facts that
might hold in a given situation (e.g., the size of
the red ship could be six) but that are currently
unknown. In any event, increased emphasis on
question-generation is likely to open up new
avenues for empirical research and process-level
models. In some cases, it might also help expand
the range of situations that are addressable within
the OED framework. For example, question
asking behavior has long been of interest to
educators (Graesser, Langston, & Bagget, 1993),
and models that apply to more complex and
realistic types of inquiry behaviors might have
greater impact.
A mosaic of question types. The question of
how to apply OED principles to more open-ended
natural language question asking exposes more
than just the issue of how this large space can be
searched. Once one allows for broader sets of
questions additional computational complexities
are often encountered. Our intention here is not
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to provide an exhaustive taxonomy of different
question types (placing questions or queries into
categories may not be particularly meaningful),
but to compare and contrast a few different types
of queries to illustrate the computational issues at
stake.
Label queries. As noted above, most informa-
tion search studies give people the option of choos-
ing from a set of narrowly defined query types. In
categorization experiments, for instance, partici-
pants can typically only inquire about the category
membership of unlabeled items (MacDonald &
Frank, 2016; Markant & Gureckis, 2014; Markant
et al., 2015). During spatial search the task is usu-
ally to query specific locations and learn what they
contain (Gureckis & Markant, 2009; Markant &
Gureckis, 2012; Najemnik & Geisler, 2005).
In machine learning, these types of queries are
called “label queries” and, similar to psychological
experiments, they constitute a large part of active
machine learning research (Settles, 2010). During
a label query, an oracle (knowledgeable human)
is asked to produce the label or class of an unla-
beled instance, which helps a classification algo-
rithm learn over time (roughly, “What is the name
of this?”). An appealing feature of label queries is
that they intuitively match some real world ques-
tion asking scenarios. For example, children often
learn by pointing out objects in the environment
and having an adult label them. Vocabulary learn-
ing of a foreign language has a similar property.
The computational evaluation of label queries
in an OED framework is relatively simple, assum-
ing the learner has a well-defined hypothesis space
(see Question 1 for why that might not be the case).
For example, when encountering an animal that is
either a cat or a dog, a child might point at it and
ask “what is that?” Knowing that there are two
possible answers (“cat” or “dog”), it is relatively
easy to compute the sum in Equation 1 (see Ques-
tion 4).
Feature queries. Instead of requesting labels
or examples, learners can also ask about the im-
portance of entire features or dimensions of cat-
egories. For example, a naive learner might ask
whether the ability to sing is an important fea-
ture for telling whether something is a bird. Un-
like label queries, this type of question does not
request the class membership of a single exem-
plar, but instead asks more generic information
about the class. Such feature queries have proven
to be successful in machine learning, in particu-
lar when human oracles are experts in a domain
and can quickly help improve a classifier’s feature
weights to accelerate learning (Raghavan, Madani,
& Jones, 2006).
The distinction between item and feature queries
holds psychological significance as well. For
example, a growing literature in developmental
psychology (see Question 9) explores information-
gathering strategies in simple games such as
“Guess Who?” or “20-questions”. When used
as an experiment, the subject tries to identify
a hidden object by asking a series of yes/no
questions. There are two broad strategies com-
monly used by human participants in the game:
hypothesis-scanning questions target a specific
instance (e.g., “Is it Bill?”), whereas constraint-
seeking questions ask about features that are
present or absent across multiple objects (e.g., “Is
the person wearing a hat?”). A classic finding in
this literature is that younger children (aged 6)
tend to ask more hypothesis-scanning questions,
while older children (aged 11) and adults use more
constraint-seeking questions (Mosher & Hornsby,
1966).
From a computational perspective, the informa-
tional value of some feature queries is easy to com-
pute (e.g., the constraint-seeking feature questions
in the “Guess Who?” game) and researchers have
used OED models as a yardstick for human per-
formance (Kachergis, Rhodes, & Gureckis, 2016;
J. D. Nelson et al., 2014; Ruggeri & Lombrozo,
2015). A more difficult problem arises when ques-
tioners do not yet know what the relevant features
might be. For example, I might ask my friend who
works in the tech industry what features are rele-
vant for predicting the survival of a new startup.
QUESTIONS ABOUT INQUIRY 19
This question would help me narrow down the set
of features that I might then proceed to ask more
targeted questions about.
This issue is widely recognized in applied Ma-
chine Learning as the problem of “Feature Engi-
neering” (Blum & Langley, 1997). When build-
ing a model in a new domain, the modeler first
needs to figure out which features to to use (or to
build from other features or from raw data). This
process often relies on human input from experts
with domain knowledge, and it precedes the ac-
tual learning phase of the model. It is thus difficult
to compute the informational value of this kind of
feature query in a way that makes it comparable to
other types of queries, even though it undoubtedly
serves an important purpose when starting inquiry
in a new domain.
Demonstration queries. Consider learning a
complex skill like how to play “Chopsticks” on
the piano. A skill is essentially a category under
which some actions count as performing the skill
and others do not. Taking a label query approach,
the learner would play a random sequence of notes
and then ask the teacher or oracle “Is that ‘Chop-
sticks‘?”, eventually learning how to perform the
piece. An alternative strategy would be to request
an example of a category (e.g., “What is an exam-
ple performance of ‘Chopsticks‘?”). This type of
active class selection or demonstration query pro-
vides a positive example of the category, which can
be highly informative, especially early in learn-
ing (Lomasky, Brodley, Aernecke, Walt, & Friedl,
2007). For example, one might want to ask to see
a good or typical example of a category member
(“What does a typical bird look like?”) before
making queries about new exemplars or specific
features. Similarly during causal structure discov-
ery, one can often learn a lot about a system by see-
ing a demonstration of how it works before mak-
ing a targeted intervention. The idea of demon-
stration queries has been considered for teaching
motor skills to social robots, who can ask a human
to demonstrate a full movement trajectory rather
than providing feedback about the robot’s own at-
tempts at a task (Cakmak & Thomaz, 2012). In hu-
mans, demonstration queries are particularly use-
ful for learning new skills. Importantly, the use-
fulness of demonstration queries depends on the
level of knowledge or expertise of the answerer,
which means that they should be chosen more or
less often based on the learner’s beliefs about the
answerer. This is a topic we discuss in more detail
in Question 6.
Demonstration queries are computationally
complex. As noted above, OED models average
across all potential answers to a question, but a
question like “What does a cat look like?” could
be answered by providing any reasonable example
of the category (a cat photo, pointing at a cat, a
drawing of a cat). For complex hypotheses or
categories it does not seem possible for the naive
question asker to simulate this set of potential
answers via explicit pre-posterior analysis. It is
thus hard to imagine how the OED framework
could provide a satisfactory explanation of how
people assess the usefulness of demonstration
queries (“What does a cat look like?”), compared
to, for example, label queries (“Is this a cat?”).
Explaining how people choose demonstration
queries, and when people deem a demonstration
query to be more helpful than other queries,
will likely require an understanding of people’s
metareasoning about query-type selection.
The role of prior knowledge in question gener-
ation
So far, this section has highlighted the problem
of modeling question types, and generating ques-
tions to serve particular goals of a learner. How-
ever, there exists a more fundamental puzzle about
the way certain questions are generated. Consider
the following examples.
• What’s the English translation of the Ger-
man term “Treppenwitz”?
• Where do raccoons sleep?
• What makes that object float in mid-air?
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• Why is that person wearing only purple?
• What do you do for a living?
What these examples have in common is not
that they expect particular types of answers (they
could ask for features, events, labels, mechanisms,
etc.), but that can be asked in the absence of any
concrete hypotheses and may be triggered by con-
text and prior knowledge alone. For a non Ger-
man speaker coming across the term “Treppen-
witz” it not necessary to actually consider particu-
lar English translations. Simply knowing that most
words or phrases can be translated between Ger-
man and English is sufficient to know that there
is information to be gained. Instead of concrete
hypotheses, such questions can be generated if the
questioner realizes that there exists some currently
unknown fact that is knowable in principle. Since
the number of unknown facts is infinite, there must
be some way of constraining the questions to those
that address specific “knowledge gaps” that can re-
alistically be closed. To frame this puzzle in an-
other way, consider how an artificial agent would
have to be programmed to generate these ques-
tions in an appropriate situation. Perhaps asking
for a translation of an unknown phrase would be
the easiest to implement if the agent’s goal is to
parse and translate sentences. But we are currently
still very far away from developing artificial in-
telligence that spontaneously asks about raccoons’
sleeping places or questions people’s odd clothing
choices in the same way a human might do on a
walk through the forest or a stroll through the city.
We propose that the structure and content of cur-
rent knowledge alone can act as a strong constraint
on query generation in the absence of hypothe-
ses. Abstract knowledge in the form of categories,
schemata, or scripts, can play an important role
in highlighting knowledge gaps (e.g., Bartlett &
Burt, 1933; Mandler, 2014; Minsky, 1974). Know-
ing that raccoons are mammals, and that a broadly
shared feature of members of the mammal cate-
gory is the need to sleep, can help us identify a
gap in our knowledge about raccoons. (In fact,
this seems to be a common question. When the
authors typed “where do raccoons” into a well-
known search engine, “sleep?” was among the
top suggested completions of the query.) Con-
versely, most people would be much less likely
to spontaneously generate the question “where do
raccoons get their nails done?”, because we have
no prior knowledge to suggest that there even ex-
ists an answer to this question. Asking about the
motivation behind a person’s odd clothing choices
similarly requires prior knowledge. At the very
least, one has to know that people generally act
based on goals and intentions, and that an all-
purple wardrobe is an unusual choice. Conven-
tions or conversational scripts are another source
of queries. For example, we learn that it is typical
to ask for someone’s name, place of residence, or
profession upon first meeting them. It is much less
common to ask about a person’s preferred sleeping
position, which might be similarly unknown, but
is not part of the conventions that apply to small
talk. Conventional sets of questions exists in many
domains, which makes the task of generating ques-
tions much easier.
What types of knowledge constrain these types
of queries? While some of them, for example so-
cial conventions, undoubtedly have to be learned,
others may be more fundamental. Foundational
knowledge, sometimes referred to as core knowl-
edge (Carey & Spelke, 1996; Spelke & Kinzler,
2007), may constrain query generation already in
early childhood, when specific world knowledge
is still sparse. For example, we know that infants
are endowed with a system of object represen-
tation involving spatio-temporal principles (such
as cohesion, continuity, and support, Spelke &
Kinzler, 2007). Furthermore, children as young
as 2 years old make relatively sophisticated as-
sumptions about causal relationships between ob-
jects (Gopnik et al., 2004). Such early knowledge
can be leveraged to help find opportunities for in-
quiry. For example, it has been shown that chil-
dren engage in more information seeking behav-
iors when their prior expectations about causal re-
QUESTIONS ABOUT INQUIRY 21
lationships or spatio-temporal principles are vio-
lated than when they are confirmed (Legare, 2012;
Stahl & Feigenson, 2015). Upon seeing an ob-
ject suspended in mid-air, children might therefore
proceed to seek further information to explain the
now apparent knowledge gap about how the ob-
ject is supported (Stahl & Feigenson, 2015). An-
other kind of core knowledge that emerges early in
life is the ability to represent animate beings as in-
tentional agents (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). Young
children expect people, but not objects, to execute
actions based on goals and plans (Meltzoff, 1995;
Woodward, 1998). This means that, similar to
adults, young children observing a person behave
in an intentional but strange manner might become
aware of a knowledge gap and try to find out what
goals or intentions could explain this behavior.
Summary. Current models of inquiry assume
that questions are generated to satisfy a particular
set of inferential goals, by testing specific hypothe-
ses about the world. However, the examples above
illustrate the wide variety of questions that arise
from knowledge gaps identified and are formulated
in other ways. Given how common such questions
are, future work on inquiry should devote more at-
tention to query generation that goes beyond the
hypothesis-testing framework. Knowledge-based
queries also raise an entirely new set of compu-
tational challenges. Accounting for these ques-
tions will often require models of domain knowl-
edge, structured representations, and fundamental
beliefs about causality and intentionality. Most in-
teresting is that these types of queries seem to fall
outside the domain of OED models, as formulated
to date, in that no alternative hypotheses need be
considered, and the set of answers may not be ex-
plicitly enumerated.
Question 3: What makes a “good” answer?
In the OED framework, a question’s expected
value is a weighted average of the value of each
of its possible answers (Equation 1). In this sense,
the value of answers is a more basic concept than
the expected value of a question. However, what
makes an answer to a query “good”? More for-
mally:
EU(Q) =
∑
a∈Q
P(a)
What
is a
good
an-
swer?
U(a) .
The importance of this issue is reflected in a vari-
ety of scientific literatures. For example, psycholo-
gists and philosophers have discussed what counts
as a good “explanation” of a phenomenon. Al-
though there are differences in people’s preference
for certain explanation types (e.g., the teleologi-
cal or ontological distinction, Kelemen & Rosset,
2009; Lombrozo & Carey, 2006), this work does
not usually involve computationally precise ways
of evaluating the quality of answers (or explana-
tions). Despite its foundational nature, in the OED
framework there is very little research on how peo-
ple evaluate an answer’s usefulness (but see, Rus-
coni, Marelli, D’Addario, Russo, & Cherubini,
2014).
To develop an initial intuition for answer qual-
ity, consider the following example dialogs. If
a learner asks someone “Where exactly do you
live?”, an answer including exact Global Position-
ing System (GPS) coordinates completely answers
the question and removes any lingering doubt. In
contrast, a more imprecise answer like “New York
City” might leave uncertainty absent any other in-
formation. The point is that our intuition is that
some answers (like the GPS) are better than others
because they are more informative. The quality of
an answer also depends on what the question asker
already knows. Consider the following exchange:
Q: What city were you born in?
A: New York City
Q: Do you live in the same city you were born?
A: Yes
Q: Which city do you live in?
A: New York City
22 .
Here, the final question-answer pair is identical to
the one above but now the answer contains no new
information.
These examples highlight a few key points
about answers. A good answer is relevant to
the given query and adds information above and
beyond what is already known by the learner.
Answers differ in quality based on the amount of
information they provide, but it is possible for two
answers to be equally good if they offer the same
query-specific information (that is, it does not
matter if one answer provides additional informa-
tion that was not called for by the query). A major
topic of research within the OED framework is
determining a general-purpose, mathematically
rigorous way of defining the quality of an answer
to a question. The most common approach is to
assume there is a type of utility associated with
answers. In the remainder of this section, we will
give a more detailed account of specific utility
measures that OED models have used to quantify
the quality of answers.
Determining the utility of answers. In the
broadest sense, it is useful to distinguish between
informational (or disinterested) and situation-
specific (or interested) utility functions (Chater,
Crocker, & Pickering, 1998; Markant & Gureckis,
2012; Meder & Nelson, 2012). Pure information
utility functions are based solely on probabili-
ties and on how answers change probabilities.
Situation-specific functions take into account that
learners collect information for a specific purpose
beyond pure knowledge gain (e.g., saving time,
money, or cognitive resources1). Both approaches
reflect hypotheses about the overall goals and
purpose of human inquiry, although the difference
between them is not always clearly acknowledged
in psychological literature.
Informational utility functions. Most OED
models evaluate answers according to how they
change a learner’s beliefs about possible hypothe-
ses. These metrics are a thus a function of the
learner’s prior belief before receiving an answer,
Table 2
Distributions showing a hypothetical learner’s
subjective belief about a parameter, θ, before and
after learning a new piece of information. The
columns show the predictions of Information Gain
(IG), Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL), and prob-
ability gain (PG). A (+) indicates a positive utility,
(o) indicates zero utility and (-) indicates a neg-
ative utility. The different approaches frequently
disagree.
Situation IG KL PG
1
Prior
Posterior
+ + +
2
Posterior
Prior + + +
3
Posterior
Prior o o o
4
PriorPosterior
o + o
5
Prior
Posterior - + -
6
Prior
Posterior
θ
+ + o
1Note that we use the term situation-specific to in-
clude both external and internal costs
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P(H), and their posterior belief having received
that answer to a their question P(H|Q = a),
which in our shorthand notation can be written
as P(H|a). (Recall that a denotes a particular
individual answer to a particular question Q.)
Information Gain, from Equations (1) and (2), is
one of the most popular functions used within
psychology, but there exist a number of interesting
alternatives, including impact (expected absolute
belief change), diagnosticity, KL divergence, and
probability gain (J. D. Nelson, 2005).
The differences between these measures may
sometimes seem subtle, but comparing them more
carefully raises interesting and fundamental ques-
tions. Consider the six scenarios depicted in Ta-
ble 2. Each scenario shows how the distribution of
a learner’s belief about some parameter θ changes
as a result of an answer to their query. The three
rightmost columns show how three different util-
ity measures evaluate the usefulness of this change
in belief. (To keep things simple, we just focus
on the sign of the model outputs. For in-depth
comparison, see J. D. Nelson, 2005). The mod-
els are Information Gain (IG), Probability Gain
(PG), and Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL). An
answer’s probability gain is the reduction in prob-
ability of incorrect guess that the answer provides.
Interestingly, it can be obtained by replacing Shan-
non Entropy, ent(H), in Equations (1) and (2) with
pFalse(H), also known as Bayes’s error:
pFalse(H) = 1 −max
h∈H
P(h). (6)
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is an alterna-
tive information-theoretic measure to Shannon en-
tropy, which is useful in comparing two distribu-
tions (in this case, a posterior and prior). When
evaluating the expected usefulness of a question,
that is, EU(Q), KL divergence and Expected In-
formation Gain (EIG) give exactly the same value,
for every possible question, in every possible sce-
nario (Oaksford & Chater, 1996). However, KL
divergence and IG can make contradictory predic-
tions when the usefulness of different specific an-
swers, i.e., U(a), is evaluated, as the examples in
Table 2 demonstrate. The KL-divergence resulting
from an answer a given question Q is
UKL(a) =
∑
h∈H
P(h|a)logP(h|a)
P(h)
. (7)
For the first two situations in Table 2, the three
models agree that the answers’ values are positive.
In both cases, the variance of the posterior has nar-
rowed, implying that the learner is now more con-
fident in the estimate of θ. Likewise in the third
example, all models assign zero value to an answer
that has not changed a learner’s beliefs at all. This
scenario captures any situation in which a learner
is told something they already know or that is ir-
relevant for answering their question.
Examples four to six show more divergent cases.
In scenario four, a learner changes their belief
about the value of θ but does not narrow their pos-
terior. For example, imagine learning that your
friend’s car is in fact a Toyota, not a Chevrolet as
you previously assumed. This would change your
estimate of the car’s costs without necessarily af-
fecting your uncertainty around the precise value.
The IG in this example is zero, since uncertainty
does not change. The same holds for the probabil-
ity of making a correct guess (PG), since the prob-
ability of the most likely hypothesis has stayed the
same. This assessment runs counter to some intu-
itive definitions of what constitutes a good answer,
since the learner has in fact changed their belief
quite substantially. A measure like KL-divergence,
which assigns positive value to this scenario, thus
may be more in line with these intuitions.
Scenario 5 is even more puzzling. Here, the
learner receives an answer that increases their un-
certainty. This leads to negative IG and PG, al-
though KL divergence is positive. (In fact, KL di-
vergence is always positive unless prior and pos-
terior are exactly the same.) Returning to the car
example, this could happen upon learning that a
friend’s car is either a Toyota or a Ford, having
previously assumed that it was probably a Chevro-
let. Now, you might end up being more uncer-
tain about its cost than before. Again, this con-
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clusion is somewhat at odds with the intuition that
something was learned in this scenario even if the
learner ended up more uncertain as a consequence.
Finally, scenario 6 shows that sometimes IG and
PG make diverging predictions. Here, the learner
has narrowed their posterior around the smaller
peak, and has therefore reduced their overall uncer-
tainty. However, the probability of the most likely
hypothesis has stayed the same; thus, the answer
has no value in terms of PG. As an example, imag-
ine that you are trying to guess the breed of your
friend’s dog and you are pretty sure it is a German
shepherd. Finding out that it is not a chihuahua be-
cause your friend is allergic to chihuahuas might
slightly change your hypothesis space about much
less likely possibilities (and therefore lead to posi-
tive IG), but not at affect your high confidence re-
garding your top hypothesis (hence zero PG).
These examples demonstrate that assigning val-
ues to answers, even from a completely disinter-
ested perspective (i.e. when one is only concerned
with quantifying belief change), is not at all trivial.
These examples raise some interesting psycholog-
ical questions, such as how people treat answers
with negative IG, or how they balance information
and the probability of making a correct choice. An
important area for future research will be to con-
sider information gain based on other types of en-
tropy metrics, and not only based on Shannon en-
tropy. For instance, Crupi and Tentori (2014) dis-
cuss information gain based on quadratic (rather
than Shannon) entropy. In fact, in mathematics,
physics, and other domains, there are many dif-
ferent entropy models, several of which could be
important in a descriptive theory of human behav-
ior (Crupi, Nelson, Meder, Cevolani, & Tentori, in
press). We will briefly return to these questions be-
low, after discussing situation-specific utility func-
tions.
Situation-Specific utility functions. Accord-
ing to situation-specific (“interested”) theories of
information search, the utility of an answer (and
therefore a query) depends on concrete goals of the
learner, irrespective of or in addition to the goal
of increasing information. Question-asking strate-
gies that are based on situation-specific goals can
yield strongly different predictions than disinter-
ested models (Meder & Nelson, 2012). For exam-
ple, consider a categorization task in which payoffs
are asymmetric, such that correctly or incorrectly
classifying items into different categories yields
different costs or penalties. This could be the case
during medical diagnosis, where there might be
greater costs associated with misclassifying a po-
tentially fatal condition than a benign one, which
leads to asymmetrical decision thresholds for treat-
ment (lower for the fatal condition). This asymme-
try should also affect the medical tests that are ad-
ministered. Tests that have the potential to change
the treatment decision are more valuable than those
that do not, irrespective of their pure informational
value (Pauker & Kassirer, 1980). Cost-sensitive
components also matter when learners have some
pure information goals (e.g., to minimize Shannon
entropy across possible hypotheses) but wish to si-
multaneously minimize time spent, cognitive de-
mands, or number of queries made.
Interestingly, people are not always sensitive to
costs of questions (Baron & Hershey, 1988) and
tend to make queries in line with pure informa-
tion strategies, like probability gain or information
gain on some tasks (Markant et al., 2015; Meder &
Nelson, 2012). An interesting question for future
work is to understand when and why this might
be the case. A preference for disinterested search
may be adaptive, for instance, if people expect to
re-use information later on in a different task. This
could be investigated by manipulating people’s be-
liefs about future re-usability to see how the use
of disinterested versus interested question asking
strategies changes. It is also possible that it is
computationally intractable in some cases to assess
situation-specific utilities. For example, Gureckis
and Markant (2009) explored how even for a sim-
ple task this can require not only computing the
utility of each individual answer, but also how in-
formation from that answer might influence a fu-
ture decision-making policy. Computing this can
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be a significant computational burden. Finally,
sometimes people only realize what the value of
an answer is when they actually see it and process
it. This would suggest that people might have to
learn to adjust their inquiry strategy as they learn
more about a given situation-specific utility func-
tion. This possibility calls for experiments that
have people assess the value of both questions and
of answers, in tandem, to test how the latter in-
fluences the former (also Question 5, on learning
from answers).
Summary. Determining the value of an an-
swer is no easy feat. Even when learners have
a good probabilistic model of the task at hand,
there are many different approaches to measure the
utility of answers, many of which have some de-
gree of plausibility. The lack of consensus on the
’right’ kind of answer utility poses an interesting
challenge for OED models, all of which define a
question’s expected usefulness as the probability-
weighed average of its possible answers’ individ-
ual usefulness values. To address this challenge,
we see several possible strategies.
First, there are a number of efforts to try to iso-
late domain-general principles of assigning values
to answers. Using carefully designed experiments,
this approach might ultimately reveal that some
functions are simply a better match for human in-
tuitions about answer utilities than others. One ex-
ample is work by J. D. Nelson et al. (2010) that
found that expected probability gain was the best-
fitting psychological model among several candi-
dates, including EIG, for information search be-
havior in a probabilistic classification task. Future
studies will be required to explore more systemati-
cally if this finding holds in other domains as well.
Second, if no domain-general information met-
ric can be found, then modeling inquiry in a new
domain or task will require an understanding of
how people assign value to received answers in
that domain. Since this is such a fundamental
building block of any OED model, it might be sen-
sible to study the value of answers in isolation, be-
fore trying to build models of the expected useful-
ness of questions.
Question 4: How do people generate and weight
possible answers to their queries?
OED models define the expected usefulness of a
question as a probability-weighted average of the
usefulness of each possible answer (Equation 1):
EU(Q) =
How do
people
weight
answers?∑
a∈Q
P(a) U(a)
We have just discussed the problem of evaluat-
ing the utility of individual answers. An entirely
different question is which answers people antic-
ipate to begin with and what probabilities are as-
signed to them. For example, if you ask someone
“Which city do you live in?”, an OED model re-
quires you to consider each possible answer (“New
York”, “Boston”, “Austin”, “Denver”, etc...) and
to weight the utility of that answer by the prob-
ability of receiving it. If you know nothing else
about an individual, the probabilities might be the
base rates from the general population. However,
if you meet a new colleague whom you know is a
professor, cities with universities or colleges might
be more probable. Importantly, the above equation
assumes that the learner knows the possible an-
swers a question might receive, and the probability
of each of those answers. In real-world tasks, as
well as in more complex experimental tasks, such
as models of eye movements in visual search or of
causal learning, models based on the OED frame-
work must make a number of usually implicit as-
sumptions about these variables.
What is a possible answer?. The OED frame-
work treats question asking as following from the
goal of obtaining information about something. As
a psychological model, OED presumes that people
know the possible answers and their probabilities.
Returning to an earlier example, if someone asks
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“Where do raccoons sleep?” it seems nonsensical
that the answer would be “blue,” improbable that
the answer is “underwater,” and likely that the an-
swer is “in a den”.
Surprisingly little research in psychology has at-
tempted to understand what people expect as an-
swers to different types of questions. Given the
tight coupling between answers and questions im-
plied by the OED framework, this could be a fertile
research topic. For example, how do differences
in how readily people consider different answers
affect information seeking-behaviors? Some ques-
tions have rather obvious or simple answer spaces
(e.g., a true/false question returns either of two an-
swers). In addition, in some cases the possible an-
swers to a question are basically the same as the
hypothesis space. For example, for the question
“What city do you live in?”, the possible hypothe-
ses are cities, as are the answers. This suggests that
issues about hypothesis generation discussed in
Question 1 might hold relevance. The space of an-
swers that people consider possible might strongly
influence the value they assign to a question. Fur-
thermore, the type of learning that happens after
receiving an unexpected versus expected answer
might be somewhat different (see Question 5). De-
spite the theoretical importance of these issues to
the OED hypothesis, little research has addressed
them.
Dealing with intractable answer spaces
As noted throughout this article, theories of in-
quiry based on OED principles share much in com-
mon with theories of decision making. This is par-
ticularly clear given that the value of a question
depends on a “tree” of possible future outcomes
similar to how in sequential choice theories the
value of an action depends on a “tree” of later ac-
tions (see Figure 3). However, as many authors
in the decision-making literature have noted, it is
computationally intractable to consider all possi-
ble future outcomes or scenarios (e.g., Huys et al.,
2012; Sutton & Barto, 1988). A variety of meth-
ods have been proposed to approximate this vast
Current choice
Next choice
Two choices ahead
Question
Possible answers
Figure 3. Top: A typical decision tree. The value
of the current choice is often assumed to depend on
the outcomes and available choices at later points
in the tree. Bottom: Structure of OED models
showing how the value of a question similarly de-
pends future states (i.e., answers to the question).
search space of outcomes, two of which we briefly
summarize here.
Integration by Monte-Carlo sampling. The
key to Monte-Carlo approximation (e.g., Guez,
Silver, & Dayan, 2012) is the fact that the quality
of a question is basically a weighted sum or inte-
gral (i.e., Equation 1). One way to approximate
this integral is to sum over a set of samples:
EU(q) =
∑
a∈A
P(a)U(a) ≈ 1
m
m∑
`=1
U(a(`)) (8)
where a(1), ..., a(m) are a set of m samples from
the P(a) distribution. In the limit as m → ∞, the
approximation based on samples converges to the
true value of EU found by weighting the value
of each answer by its appropriate probability.
Under the Monte-Carlo approach, people might
repeatedly mentally simulate different answers
they could receive and evaluate the utility of each.
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Highly probable answers would be generated
often whereas less probable answers might rarely
be simulated. In the case where the number of
answers is large, or where some answers are
very unlikely this approximate sum may be more
computationally efficient. In addition, when m is
small certain biases might be introduced (e.g., rare
answers are less likely to be sampled and thus less
likely to enter into the evaluation of a question).
Integration by tree pruning. An alternative
approach assumes explicit “tree pruning” where
certain future paths of the decision tree are selec-
tively ignored. For example, Huys et al. (2012)
consider tree pruning in a sequential decision-
making task. The basic idea is that rather than
considering all possible paths of a decision tree
unfolding from a particular choice (e.g., Figure 3,
top), an agent might selectively drop certain paths.
In the Huys et al. setting this including pruning
sequential paths that likely lead to particular types
of outcomes (e.g., punishment). An analogous
strategy in the OED setting might mean removing
from consideration answers for which P(a) falls
below some threshold. While such ideas have
yet to be tested in the inquiry literature, certain
heuristic strategies should bias choices in spe-
cific ways. For example, it may be possible to
experimentally detect a tendency to discard low
probability answers with high information utility.
Integration by generalized means. A final ap-
proach considers alternative ways of computing
P(a), and the possibility of averaging some func-
tion of answer utility values, rather than the raw
answer utility values themselves. The General
Theory of Means (Muliere & Parmigiani, 1993)
provides a general mathematical framework. One
extension of Equation 1 is to use answer weights
that are nonnegative and sum to 1, but which do
not necessarily correspond to answer probabilities:
EU(q) =
∑
a∈A
w(a)U(a) (9)
Defining expected utility in terms of answer
weights, rather than answer probabilities, high-
lights that in the normative theoretical sense, there
is a decision to make about what kind of weights
to use (e.g., maximum entropy consistent with
known constraints, or a minimax strategy, etc).
The basic constraint in the General Theory of
Means framework is that the weights should be
nonnegative and should sum to 1. For exam-
ple, if the probability of some answers is well-
understood, but the probability of other answers is
not known, people might assign higher weight to
answers with less-well-understood probabilities,
other things being equal. The important points,
theoretically, are: (1) from a normative standpoint,
we seldom really know the answer probabilities
and (2) from a descriptive standpoint, although
answer weighting is central to OED models,
we still lack a good understanding how people
actually evaluate answer utilities.
Summary. The OED framework defines the
value of a question as the probability-weighed av-
erage of the value of its individual answers. We
have reason to suspect that this is not the full story,
given that the probability of individual answers
is not always knowable, that it is combinatori-
ally difficult or impossible to integrate all possible
answers in some circumstances, and that various
heuristic strategies might be simpler. Proposals
from the decision-making literature suggest some
computationally feasible strategies to handle the
combinatorics of evaluating all possible answers’
usefulness. Assessing how people weight individ-
ual answers is ripe for future research, as alternate
proposals can be well-specified, and there has been
virtually no research in this area to date.
Question 5: How does learning from answers
affect query selection?
Like a scientist who considers what they could
learn from possible outcomes of their experiments,
an optimal question asker anticipates how an an-
swer would change their current beliefs. For ex-
ample, computing the expected new Shannon en-
tropy in the EIG model entirely relies on the degree
of belief change:
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ent(H|a) = −
∑
h∈H
How
do
people
change
be-
liefs?
P(h|a) logP(h|a)
This aspect of question evaluation is a key idea be-
hind the concept of preposterior analysis (Raiffa &
Schlaifer, 1961) and lies at the heart of the OED
approach.
Leaving aside the computational challenges of
simulating all possible answers (see previous sec-
tion), how people update their beliefs based on
new data is one of the most fundamental (and con-
tentious) questions in many areas of higher-level
cognition, including language acquisition, catego-
rization, stochastic learning, and judgments under
uncertainty (e.g., Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp,
2006). Findings from this longstanding line of
work can inform the study of inquiry in a num-
ber of ways, two of which will be discussed below.
First, we will discuss how deviations from OED
norms during inquiry can emerge from particular
violations of inference norms. Second, we will
show that inductive inference strategies are often
heavily influenced by the current context and the
identity and intentions of the person providing the
information. Since a vast number of inquiry sce-
narios are embedded in some form of social or ed-
ucational context, understanding this pragmatic as-
pect of inference is pivotal for a complete account
of question-asking.
Inductive norm violations. There are many
ways in which people deviate from (Bayesian) in-
ductive principles when integrating new evidence
with prior knowledge. Consider the following
well-known examples.
• It has been shown that in some situations
people exhibit what is often called base-rate
neglect (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schi-
avo, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).
Base rate neglect is the tendency to evalu-
ate the posterior probability of a hypothesis,
P(h|e), mostly based on its ability to account
for the new evidence, P(e|h), while largely
ignoring its prior probability, P(h).
• When evidence is presented sequentially,
people often reveal the opposite phe-
nomenon. That is, they assign too much
weight on their initial beliefs and behave
conservatively when updating these beliefs
in light of new evidence (Edwards, 1968;
Phillips & Edwards, 1966).
• In other tasks, it has been shown that peo-
ple exhibit a positivity bias. That is, they as-
sign more weight to positive evidence (e.g.,
learning that something is true) compared to
negative evidence (learning that something
is false), even when both types of evidence
are equally diagnostic (Hodgins & Zucker-
man, 1993; Klayman, 1995).
There is ongoing debate on whether these phe-
nomena count as biases and whether they can be
explained based on people’s task-specific beliefs or
preferences (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006; Kah-
neman et al., 1982; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007).
What’s important for the present discussion is that
they can have significant impact on the expected
information value of possible questions. For ex-
ample, base-rate neglect could lead people to ask
questions about hypotheses that can be tested eas-
ily, even if the hypothesis in question is unlikely
a priori. Among other things, this could lead to
an unwarranted preference for medical tests with
a high hit-rate, even if they produce many false
positives (some authors would argue that frequent
mammograms are an example for the tendency to
seek such tests; see Elmore et al., 1998; Gigeren-
zer, Mata, & Frank, 2009). Conservatism during
question asking could lead to a type of “question-
asking myopia” whereby askers make a greater
effort to test their initial hypotheses, instead of
considering alternatives that appeared less likely
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in the beginning but are supported by incoming
data. This could explain the finding that people
who are asked to state their hypotheses early dur-
ing a mock police investigation were subsequently
more biased in their information-seeking strategies
than those who were not asked to do so (O’Brien
& Ellsworth, 2006). (The former group not only
showed higher confidence in their initial hypoth-
esis, but also sought more evidence for it, irre-
spective of the alternatives.) Overweighting pos-
itive evidence could lead to a preference for ques-
tions that people expect to yield “yes” answers.
This possibility in particular could provide another
explanation for people’s use of a positive testing
strategy (discussed above, see also, Klayman &
Ha, 1989; Wason, 1960).
These examples show that deviations from opti-
mal induction principles and violations of inquiry
norms can be intimately intertwined. However,
even though the relationship between them has
been pointed out before (Klayman & Ha, 1989;
Nickerson, 1998), it is rare for psychologists to
consider the two in tandem (but see Coenen &
Gureckis, 2015).
Pragmatic & Pedagogical Reasoning. Hu-
man inquiry does not take place in a vacuum,
nor are people’s questions typically directed at
an anonymous oracle with unknown properties.
Instead, many question-asking scenarios involve
a social context that is shared between the ques-
tioner and the answerer. Furthermore, questioners
usually have at least some expectations about the
knowledge, beliefs, and intentions of answerers.
This means that evaluating the usefulness of poten-
tial answers crucially depends on pragmatic and
(in a teaching context) pedagogical considerations.
Shared context. Imagine that at the end of a
meal your friend asks “Are you going to finish
that?” Your interpretation and potential answer
will be completely different if your friend is
currently the host of a dinner party (they want to
clear the table) or simply sharing a meal with you
at a restaurant (they want to eat your food). It’s of
course not a new insight that interpretations of lan-
guage depend on our understanding of the shared
context between speaker and listener (Grice,
1975; Lewis, 1969). However, recent advances
in probabilistic pragmatics have made it possible
to formalize them as part of a Bayesian inference
framework (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman
& Stuhlmüller, 2013; Goodman & Frank, 2016),
which can be integrated with other probabilistic
models, including OED models. To illustrate
the main idea behind a probabilistic model of
pragmatic interpretation, consider the example
in Figure 4 from from Goodman and Frank’s
(2016) Rational Speech Act (RSA) model. Here, a
speaker is referring to one of three friends and the
listener has to infer which one. The listener does
so by recursively simulating the speaker’s beliefs
about their own beliefs, starting from a simplistic,
“literal” (Lit) version of the listener who updates
their beliefs about the world based on Bayes’ rule
and a flat prior over referents. Based on this literal
listener, the simulated speaker infers that the most
informative way of pointing out the hat-wearing
friend would have been to refer to the hat directly.
Thus, the mention of glasses must refer to the
hat-less friend with glasses.
A good demonstration of how this probabilistic
pragmatic framework can be combined with OED
comes from a study by Hawkins, Stuhlmüller, De-
gen, and Goodman (2015). They used the RSA
model together with EIG to model people’s be-
havior in a guessing game. In this task, partici-
pants were assigned the roles of questioners and
answerers. Questioners had the task of finding out
the location of hidden objects (e.g., “find the poo-
dle”) by directing questions at the answerers, who
could see all of the objects (e.g., a poodle, a Dal-
matian, a cat, etc.). Questioners were placed un-
der a set of restrictions on the types of questions
they could ask (e.g., must not ask about poodles,
but may ask about Dalmatians or dogs) and an-
swerers were equally aware of those restrictions.
The study showed that questioners could come up
with clever indirect questions (e.g., “where’s the
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Figure 4. The RSA (rational speech act) frame-
work models pragmatic reasoning as a recursive
process. Figure adapted from Goodman & Frank
(2016).
dog?”) that were correctly interpreted by the an-
swerers who then gave helpful answers (revealing
the location of the poodle, not the Dalmatian). The
authors found that both questioners and answer-
ers were better captured by the combination of an
RSA model and EIG than by a “pure” EIG model
that just used the literal meaning of both questions
and answers. This finding demonstrates that when
learners try to anticipate the likelihood of different
answers, they also take into account the context or
state of the world that is shared with their counter-
part.
Features of the teacher. Another impor-
tant factor that affects what we learn from our
questions is the intention and expertise of the
person providing the answer. For example, we
would expect to receive different answers from a
knowledgeable and helpful teacher (Tenenbaum,
1999) than from someone who is uninformed or
ill-intentioned. This difference between learning
in pedagogical and non-pedagogical situations
has recently been explored computationally and
experimentally (Shafto, Goodman, & Griffiths,
2014; Shafto, Goodman, & Frank, 2012), showing
that learners and teachers can make sophisticated
inferences about each others’ minds in order to
improve learners’ success. A good demonstration
is learning from examples. In a teaching context,
learners can usually expect examples to carry more
information than just labels, since they expect
teachers to choose particular examples that will
help the learner generalize (Gweon, Tenenbaum,
& Schulz, 2010; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001;
Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007). For example, teachers
might provide prototypical examples of a category
to allow the learner to pick up on the relevant
features needed for future classification.
An important question for future research is how
askers and answerers simulate the mental states
of their counterpart and how many levels of re-
cursive inference (“I think that they think that I
think that they think, etc. ...”) are involved in
this process. Recent work in probabilistic prag-
matics has demonstrated individual variability in
terms of levels of recursion (Franke & Degen,
2016). Given the evidence that even young chil-
dren make pedagogical assumptions about teach-
ing adults (Bonawitz et al., 2011; Kushnir, Well-
man, & Gelman, 2008), another question concerns
the developmental trajectory of these abilities and
how world knowledge (what do people generally
assume about one another in question asking sce-
narios?) and social reasoning (what are the inten-
tions of this particular individual?) contribute and
interact to shape the extremely sophisticated infer-
ences that adults make about each other during in-
quiry.
Summary. Many OED models assume that
learners anticipate how the answers to their queries
will change their current beliefs. Here, we pointed
out two important factors that may constrain
this process and consequently affect how queries
are chosen. First, given what we know about
the plethora of inductive inference biases that
people exhibit in other tasks, there is little reason
to believe that anticipating future belief-change
during inquiry should follow normative principles
(Bayes’s Rule) in every respect. Thus, when there
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is reason to believe that people are anticipating
future belief change (like OED models suggest),
one has to take into account how biases in this
process would affect potential biases during query
selection. Second, when answers are provided
by other people, as it is often the case during
inquiry, learners’ inferences will be constrained by
pragmatic and pedagogical considerations. Thus,
to build realistic inquiry models, we need a better
understanding of the psychological underpinnings
of inferences in social contexts.
Question 6: How do cognitive constraints influ-
ence inquiry strategies?
Previous sections of this paper have pointed
out that the OED framework, if interpreted in a
mechanistic way, makes very ambitious compu-
tational demands that would indubitably exceed
learners’ memory and processing limitations. In
earlier sections we discussed the idea that learners
may sometimes restrict their hypothesis space,
sample from their posterior beliefs, or approx-
imate the aggregation of answer utilities into a
question utility. These ideas fall largely within the
OED framework in the sense that they represent
cognitively plausible but statistically principled
approximations. However, another possibility is
that people use an entirely different set of strate-
gies that are not curtailed versions of OED models
to balance the trade-off between computation,
accuracy and ease of processing (Simon, 1976).
One inquiry strategy that has received a lot of
attention in educational psychology is the princi-
ple of controlling variables (CV). A CV strategy
says that learners design experiments by changing
one experimental variable at a time and holding
everything else constant. Besides the benefit of
yielding unconfounded evidence, this strategy is
considered desirable because it is relatively easy
to use and teach (Case, 1974; Z. Chen & Klahr,
1999), even though children do not often generate
it spontaneously (Kuhn et al., 1995; Kuhn, Black,
Keselman, & Kaplan, 2000). By focusing on only
one variable at a time, it reduces the number of
items to be held in working memory and also cre-
ates easily interpretable evidence (Klahr, Fay, &
Dunbar, 1993; Tschirgi, 1980). Although CV is of-
ten treated as a normative strategy (Inhelder & Pi-
aget, 1958), its effectiveness in an OED sense actu-
ally depends on very specific features of the system
of variables at hand. For example, when there are
many variables but very few of them have any ef-
fect on the outcome, it can be much more efficient
to manipulate multiple variables at once, assum-
ing that testing for the occurrence of the outcome
is costly. However, adults often still test variables
in isolation, even when testing multiple variables
is more efficient (Coenen et al., 2017). Empiri-
cally, these results may reflect the prominence of
controlling variables in educational settings, or be-
cause people experience the CV strategy to effec-
tively balance effectiveness and ease of use. The
key point for the present purposes is that the CV
strategy is not entirely equivalent to OED.
There are other ways in which people might
trade off informativeness and computational
tractability. Klayman and Ha (1987, 1989) found
that participants often engage in a strategy they
called limit testing. According to this approach,
people restrict their hypothesis set to one focal
hypothesis and seek confirmatory evidence for it.
However, within that focal hypothesis people still
test regions of higher uncertainty. For example, if
a learner’s focal hypothesis in a rule testing task
was that “countries in South America” satisfy the
rule, they might test this hypothesis by asking
about South American countries at geographical
extremes (e.g., Venezuela and Uruguay), to make
sure that the true hypothesis is not in fact smaller
than the current one (e.g., “countries in South
America that are South of the Equator”). This
strategy allows learners to refine their beliefs
while still engaging in positive testing, which
violates OED norms in many circumstances
(see Introduction). Like a controlling variables
strategy, limit testing thus does not count as an
“optimal” strategy without significant additional
assumptions (J. D. Nelson et al., 2001). However,
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it might be a very reasonable approach given
constraints of a learner’s ability to represent the
full set of hypotheses.
Other examples include the idea that people
can simply mentally compare two alternative hy-
potheses, look for places where they diverge, and
then ask queries specifically about such diverging
points. This process does not require enumerating
all possible queries or answers, but it may be a
reasonable heuristic in many cases. For example,
when deciding between two hypotheses about the
structure of a causal system, it is possible to choose
which variables to manipulate by comparing the
two structures and finding points where they differ
(e.g., links that go in opposite directions). In fact,
such a “link comparison” heuristic can sometimes
closely mimic predictions from an EIG model
(Coenen et al., 2015).
Finally, some inquiry behaviors might be se-
lected via a reinforcement learning strategy where
questions or actions that lead to positive outcomes
are repeated (Sutton & Barto, 1988). For exam-
ple, you might ask a speaker in a psychology talk
“Did you consider individual differences in your
study?” because in the past this has been a useful
question to ask no matter the speaker or content.
While this might lead to highly stereotyped and
context-inappropriate questions, it is in fact pos-
sible to train sophisticated reinforcement learning
agents to adapt question asking to particular cir-
cumstances based on intrinsic and extrinsic reward
signals (Bachman, Sordoni, & Trischler, 2017).
Importantly, the reinforcement learning approach
arrives at the value of an action in an entirely differ-
ent way than an OED model. Instead of prospec-
tively evaluating possible answers and their impact
on current beliefs, it relies on a history of past re-
inforcement. Depending on the specific assump-
tions, this approach may be discriminable from
OED models, particularly during early learning of
inquiry strategies.
Adaptive strategy selection. These alter-
native information-gathering strategies deserve
consideration alongside OED not only as alter-
native theoretical frameworks (as for instance
the reinforcement learning approach might rep-
resent) but also because they might represent
cognitive strategies that trade off against more
OED-consistent approaches in different situations.
Following on this latter idea, what determines
whether people follow an optimal OED norm or
a heuristic that is easier to use, like controlling
variables or limit testing? While determinants of
strategy selection have been studied extensively
in other domains, like decision making (Lieder
et al., 2014; Marewski & Schooler, 2011; Otto,
Raio, Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013; Rieskamp &
Otto, 2006), relatively little work addresses this
question in the inquiry literature. One exception
is a recent study by Coenen et al. (2015), who
investigated the use of an OED norm (EIG) and
a simpler heuristic (positive testing strategy) in a
causal inquiry task. Across multiple experiments,
participants were asked to intervene on three-
variable causal systems to determine which of two
possible causal structures governed the behavior
of each system (similar to Figure 5, top). Figure 5
(bottom) shows posterior inferences over the
hyperparameter µ from a hierarchical Bayesian
model of people’s intervention choices. This pa-
rameter measures the degree to which participants,
on average, relied on an EIG strategy (µ = 1),
compared to a positive testing heuristic (µ = 0),
which cannot be explained as an approximation of
EIG (see paper for full argument). The different
distributions are posterior distributions of this pa-
rameter for different between-subject experiments
that varied a number of task parameters. In the
“Baseline” experiment, participants’ behavior was
best described by a mixture of the two strategies.
In subsequent experiments, however, behavior
spanned a wide spectrum of strategy profiles. In
the experiment corresponding to the rightmost
distribution, labeled “EIG superior”, participants
received an additional set of problems before
completing the baseline task. These problems
were specifically designed to penalize non-OED
strategies (i.e. positive testing would yield com-
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pletely uninformative outcomes most of the time,
costing participants money). Having worked on
these problems, participants were more likely to
use EIG in the baseline part of the experiment,
which indicates that, in principle, most people are
able to implement the normative solutions if they
learn that their performance would suffer severely
otherwise. In contrast, in three experiments that
added time pressure to the baseline task (see three
leftmost distributions), participants’ behavior
was much more in line with the positive testing
heuristic. This indicates that the availability of
cognitive resources can determine how people
trade off the use of more complex OED norms and
simpler inquiry heuristics.
In a related example, Gureckis and Markant
(2009) explored how people searched for in-
formation in a simple spatial game based on
Battleship (see Figure 2). They identified two
distinct search “modes” as the task unfolded. At
the beginning of the task when the hypothesis
space was relatively unconstrained, people’s
choices were less in accordance with specific OED
predications and instead appeared more random
and exploratory. These decisions were also made
relatively quickly. However, at later points in the
game, people seemed to behave more in line with
OED predictions and their reaction times slowed
significantly. This particularly happened in parts
of the task where a small number of highly similar
hypotheses became viable (i.e., situations where
OED might be more computationally tractable).
This suggests that even within the context of
a single learning problem, people might shift
between strategies that are more exploratory
(i.e., less directed by specific hypothesis) and
more focused on the disambiguation of specific
alternative hypotheses.
Summary. There are many factors that have
yet to be explored with respect to their impact on
strategy selection during inquiry, including task
difficulty, working memory capacity, fatigue, and
stress. Research into these topics will allow the
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Figure 5. Top: Examples of two possible causal
graphs relating three nodes (variables). The nodes
can take on one of two values (on or off). In the ex-
periment, participants had to intervene on a similar
system by setting the value of the nodes in order
to determine which of two possible causal graphs
actually described the operation of a unknown sys-
tem. Bottom: Inferred posterior probability over
hyperparameter µ in different experiments reported
in Coenen, Rehder, and Gureckis (2015). µ cap-
tures the average strategy weight of participants in
a causal intervention task. When µ = 1, behavior
is completely captured by the OED norm Expected
Information Gain (EIG), when µ = 0, it is best
fit with a heuristic positive testing strategy (PTS).
Values in-between correspond to mixed strategies.
field to move beyond simple demonstrations of the
OED principle and help explain and predict inquiry
behavior in different environments and given par-
ticular circumstances of the learner. This topic is of
practical importance because inquiry plays a cru-
cial role in a number of high-stakes situations that
happen under both external (e.g., time) and internal
(e.g., stress) constraints, like emergency medical
diagnosis or criminal investigations. Finally, this
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line of research also dovetails with a growing in-
terest in cognitive science for models that take into
account the cost of computation, and could con-
tribute to the empirical basis for the development
of these models (Hamrick, Smith, Griffiths, & Vul,
2015; Lieder et al., 2014; Vul et al., 2014).
Question 7: What triggers inquiry behaviors in
the first place?
OED models describe how people query their
environment to achieve some particular learning
goal. The importance of such goals is made clear
by the fact that in experiments designed to evaluate
OED principles, participants are usually instructed
on the goal of a task and are often incentivized by
some monetary reward tied to achieving that goal.
Similarly, in developmental studies, children are
often explicitly asked to answer certain questions,
solve a particular problem, or choose between a
set of actions (e.g., play with toy A or toy B, see
Bonawitz et al., 2010). However, many real world
information-seeking behaviors are generated in the
absence of any explicit instruction, learning goal,
or monetary incentive. What then inspires people
to inquire about the world in the first place?
This is an extremely broad question and there
are many possible answers. According to one ap-
proach, the well-specified goals that are typically
used in OED experiments are representative of a
more general information-maximizing “over-goal”
that always accompanies people while navigating
the world (e.g., Friston et al., 2015). This view is
particularly well represented by research on chil-
dren’s exploratory play, where the claim is often
made that this behavior represents sophisticated
forms of self-guided inquiry that arise sponta-
neously during unsupervised exploration (Schulz,
2012b). For example, Cook et al. (2011), whose
study is described in more detail above, argue
that OED computations form an integral part of
preschoolers’ self-guided behavior even in in the
absence of concrete goals:
“...many factors affect the optimal
actions: prior knowledge and recent
experience enter through the term
P(H), while knowledge about possible
actions and likely affordances enters
through the term P(D|A, H). ... Our
results suggest that children are sensi-
tive to all of these factors and integrate
them to guide exploratory play” (p.
348).
Under this view, the constraints of popular experi-
mental paradigms simply help control for and stan-
dardize the behavior across participants, while still
capturing the key aspects of self-motivated inquiry.
One objection to this view is that at any given
moment there are many possible inquiry tasks a
learner might decide to pursue. While reading
this paper you might be tempted to take a break
and read about the latest world news, track down
the source of a strange sound you hear from the
kitchen, or start learning a new instrument. All of
these actions might reduce your uncertainty about
the world in various ways, but it seems difficult to
imagine how OED principles would help explain
which task you choose to focus on.
An alternative view acknowledges these limita-
tions of the OED framework and instead argues
that OED applies specifically to inquiry devoted
to some particular task “frame" (i.e., a setting in
which certain hypotheses and actions become rele-
vant). For example, a task frame might be a person
in a foreign country trying to determine if the local
custom involves tipping for service. The set of hy-
potheses relevant to this task deal specifically with
the circumstances where people might be expected
to tip (never, only for bar service, only for ex-
ceptional service, etc...), and do not include com-
pletely irrelevant hypotheses (e.g., how far away
the moon is in kilometers). In psychology exper-
iments, such tasks are made clear by the instruc-
tions, but in everyday settings a learner must chose
a task before they engage in OED-like reasoning or
learning strategies. This latter view seems some-
what more likely because absent a task frame the
hypothesis generation issue (see Question 1) be-
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comes even more insidious (imagine simultane-
ously enumerating hypotheses about events in the
news, possible sources of noise in the kitchen, and
strategies for improving your piano play). How-
ever, this leaves open the question of how people
define these tasks or goals in the first place. Here
we consider two elements to this selection: sub-
goal identification and intrinsic curiosity.
Subgoal construction. When learning it often
makes sense to divide problems into individual
components that can be tackled on their own. For
example, if a learner’s broader goal is to find out
which ships are hidden in which location during
a game of Battleship (see Figure 2), they might
break down the problem into first approximating
all the ships’ locations, and then determining
their shapes. For example, Markant, Settles, and
Gureckis (2015) describe an empirical task that
led people to decompose a 3-way categorization
task into a series of 2-way classification problems
while learning via self-guided inquiry. This
happened despite the fact that the overall goal was
to learn all three categories.
Many learning problems have a hierarchical
structure of over-goals and subgoals. Whereas
OED norms make predictions about how to
address each individual subgoal, they do not nat-
urally capture the process of dividing a problem
space into different subsets of goals.
Understanding how people identify subgoals
while approaching a complex learning problem
is difficult (although there exists efforts in the
reinforcement learning literature to formalize
this process, see e.g., Botvinick, Niv, & Barto,
2009). A full account of subgoal development
would probably require knowing a person’s
representation of the features of a problem and
their preferences for the order of specific types of
information.
However, there also exist cases in which goal
partitions emerge not from an informational anal-
ysis of every individual problem, but via a learn-
ing process across many problems that yields a
kind of “template” for asking questions in some
domain. A college admissions interviewer might
learn, for example, that in order to estimate the
quality of a prospective student, it is a useful sub-
goal to find out what types of books they’ve read
in high school. This may not be the most efficient
subgoal to learn about each individual student (it
is probably more useful for potential English ma-
jors than Physics applicants), but may lead to good
enough outcomes on average. In many domains
such templates do not even need to be learned, be-
cause they have been developed by others and can
be taught easily. Consider for example the “Five
Ws” (Who? What? When? Where? Why?) that
serve as a template for question-asking subgoals
in many different areas of inquiry and for many
different types of over-goals (solving a crime, fol-
lowing a storyline, understanding the causal struc-
ture of an event, etc.). It would be interesting to
study how such conventional templates influence
people’s preferences for establishing hierarchies of
goals, and how learned and conventional partitions
trade-off or compete with the expected value of in-
formation, in particular tasks.
The subgoal/over-goal framework might pro-
vide a useful way for thinking about how OED
principles might be selected in the first place. A
learner might have a generic over-goal to “be an
informed citizen” and this then leads to a variety
of smaller inquiry tasks that help learn about
the impact of proposed changes to tax policy or
in the political maneuvering of various parties.
Behaviors within these subgoals may look more
like OED inquiry where alternative hypotheses
are considered; by contrast, the over-goal is more
nebulous and is not associated with enumerable
hypotheses.
In sum, at least one piece of the puzzle for what
triggers inquiry behavior is to consider how people
select task frames. The subgoal idea may be an ad-
ditional fruitful direction, because it makes clear
how self-defined objectives might be constructed
during learning.
Curiosity and Intrinsic Motivation. Of
course, aside from specific goals, we might decide
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to spend more time learning about a topic or task
frame simply because we are curious. While
disinterested OED models (i.e., those with a
value function that does not include internal or
external costs) are agnostic about why learners
seek out information, there is a longstanding
parallel research tradition in psychology that
studies the cognitive and neural bases of curiosity
and intrinsic motivation. For example, it is well-
known that children spontaneously explore objects
with some level of complexity or uncertainty
without any instruction to do so (Cook et al.,
2011; Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin, 2012; Schulz
& Bonawitz, 2007; Stahl & Feigenson, 2015).
Meanwhile, adults care about the answers to
otherwise useless trivia questions (Kang et al.,
2009). Experiments have also shown that humans
and other primates are even willing to sacrifice
primary rewards (like water, money, and time)
in exchange for information without obvious use
(Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015;
Kang et al., 2009; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016).
To exhaustively review this literature is beyond
the scope of this paper, and would be largely re-
dundant in light of recent review articles on the
subject (Gottlieb, 2012; Gottlieb, Oudeyer, Lopes,
& Baranes, 2013; Kidd & Hayden, 2015; Loewen-
stein, 1994; Oudeyer, Gottlieb, & Lopes, 2016).
However, there are some particularly intriguing
findings and theoretical developments in the cu-
riosity literature that we think deserve attention
by psychologists studying inquiry with OED mod-
els. In particular, they point out factors and mech-
anisms that add value to certain sources of in-
formation over others. These sources of value
could potentially be integrated with OED models
to yield more accurate predictions about how peo-
ple choose subjects of inquiry.
To explain curiosity, researchers have tradition-
ally suggested that it is a primary drive (perhaps as
a consequence of some evolutionary process that
favors information seekers), or an expression of
some innate tendency for sense-making (Berlyne,
1966; Chater & Loewenstein, 2015; Loewenstein,
1994). Similarly, recent work has proposed that
people seek information because it generates
a type of intrinsic reward, similar to “classic”
extrinsic rewards, like food or money (Blanchard
et al., 2015; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). In support
of this claim, some studies have found activation
in primates’ neural reward circuitry during infor-
mation search that is similar to activation during
other types of value-based choice (specifically,
the primate data was collected in dopaminergic
midbrain neurons Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka,
2011; Redgrave & Gurney, 2006). Furthermore,
a set of recent fMRI studies with humans has
found correlations between people’s self-reported
curiosity about trivia-questions and activation in
areas of the brain involved in processing other
rewards (Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014;
Kang et al., 2009).
What types of information can trigger such
intrinsic reward signals? A key component of
many theories of curiosity-driven learning is an
inverse U-shaped relationship between a learner’s
current knowledge and their expressed curiosity
about some fact, domain, or stimulus (Kang et
al., 2009; Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin, 2014; Kidd
& Hayden, 2015; Loewenstein, 1994). This
means that curiosity is often highest for domains
or tasks in which people’s knowledge is at an
intermediate level. This finding tallies with
learning and memory research showing that items
with intermediate difficulty are often learned most
efficiently (Atkinson, 1972; Metcalfe & Kornell,
2003). Thus, asking questions about facts or
relationships that are “just slightly beyond the
individual’s current grasp” (Metcalfe & Kornell,
2003) might be an adaptive strategy that helps
direct people’s attention to worthwhile opportuni-
ties for learning (Vygotsky, 1962). This suggests
that intrinsic reward from information can stem
from a learner’s expected learning progress, an
idea which is already used to build algorithms
in self-motivated robots (Oudeyer, Kaplan, &
Hafner, 2007).
Another source of informational value is the
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anticipation of extrinsic rewards in the future that
might come from obtaining information in the
present. This was demonstrated empirically by
Rich and Gureckis (2014, 2017), who showed that
people’s willingness to explore risky prospects
increased with their expectation to encounter them
again in the future. This instrumental motivation
to explore may actually underlie many kinds of
seemingly intrinsically motivated information-
seeking behaviors, or at least play some part in
shaping people’s motivation to seek information.
For example, one might be intrinsically curious
about the answer to a trivia question, but this effect
could be enhanced if the question also pertains
to one’s future goals (a trivia question about the
capital cities in South America would have more
appeal for someone who has to take a geography
test next week).
While work on curiosity does not specifically fo-
cus on how people choose particular task frames
and subgoals, it does identify factors that affect
what kinds information people seek and offer some
hints about why they do so in the first place. Fu-
ture work is needed to disentangle when people
seek information for instrumental (future extrin-
sic reward) or epistemic (knowledge progress) pur-
poses, and what types of information have evolved
to yield particularly strong intrinsic rewards.
Summary. Identifying the source of people’s
thirst for information lies outside the realm of
the OED framework. However, it also lies at
the very core of what makes inquiry such a
fundamental and fascinating human activity, and
thus deserves further study. To arrive at a unified
set of computational principles that underlie
curiosity, motivation, and informational value will
likely require overlapping efforts by cognitive
psychologists, neuroscientists and developmental
researchers (Kidd & Hayden, 2015). Furthermore,
recent advances in reinforcement learning models
of intrinsic motivation (Oudeyer et al., 2007, 2016;
Singh, Barto, & Chentanez, 2004) may serve as
an important inspiration for computationally
informed theories.
Question 8: How does inquiry-driven learning
influence what we learn?
The OED framework emphasizes effective or
even optimal information gathering which, in turn,
implies more effective learning. One of the major
reasons that inquiry behavior is a topic of study is
because it has implications for how best to struc-
ture learning experiences in classrooms and other
learning environments. For example, in the ma-
chine learning literature, active information selec-
tion can be proven to reduce the number of train-
ing examples needed to reach a particular level of
performance (Settles, 2010). However, a key ques-
tion is if active inquiry reliably conveys the same
advantages for human learners. In the following
section we review existing work on this topic, first
considering the relevant benefits of active over pas-
sive learning, and next considering the effect of the
decision to stop gathering information on learning.
Our core question here concerns when active learn-
ing improves learning outcomes and how knowl-
edge acquired during active learning can deviate
from underlying patterns in the environment.
Active versus passive learning. A number of
studies have attempted to compare active and pas-
sive learning in simple, well controlled environ-
ments (Castro et al., 2008; Markant & Gureckis,
2014; Sim, Tanner, Alpert, & Xu, 2015). For
example, Markant and Gureckis (2014) had par-
ticipants learn to classify simple shapes into two
categories. The experiment contrasted standard,
passive learning against a self-directed learning
condition. In the passive learning condition, an
exemplar was presented on the screen and after
the delay the category label of the item was pro-
vided. Across trials participants attempted to learn
how to best classify new exemplars. In the ac-
tive learning condition, participants could design
the exemplars themselves on each trial, and re-
ceived the category label of the designed item. The
critical difference between these conditions is if
the learner themselves controls which exemplar is
presented (active learning) or if it is selected by
the experimenter or some external process (pas-
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sive learning). The study found that active learn-
ing led to faster acquisition of the category than
passive learning. Furthermore, a third condition,
in which yoked participants viewed the designed
examples of the active group in a passive setting,
showed significantly worse performance than the
other groups. The results showed that allowing
participants to control the selection process dur-
ing learning improved outcomes (a process the au-
thors referred to as the hypothesis-dependent sam-
pling bias). This bias is the tendency of active
learners to select information to evaluate the hy-
pothesis they currently have in mind, which of-
ten does not transfer to other learners (such as the
yoked condition) who have alternative hypotheses
in mind (Markant & Gureckis, 2014). One study
has since tested this idea with children (Sim et al.,
2015), while another has explored the boundaries
of the effect (MacDonald & Frank, 2016; Markant,
2016).
A potential downside of selecting data based on
one’s current hypotheses and goals is highlighted
by an idea that Fiedler (2008) calls the “ultimate
sampling dilemma” According to this idea, there
are two main ways people obtain information from
the world around them. The first is natural sam-
pling, a learning process in which the ambient sta-
tistical patterns of the environment are experienced
through mostly passive observation. Natural sam-
pling is related to unsupervised learning (Gureckis
& Love, 2003; Pothos & Chater, 2005) but focuses
more on the data generating process (i.e., how ex-
amples are encountered) rather than the lack of su-
pervision and corrective feedback. For example,
by walking around a new city one might get a sense
of the typical size of a car in the region. Arti-
ficial sampling refers to situations where learners
intervene on the world to influence what they learn
about (e.g., asking about the size of one partic-
ular brand of car), thereby interrupting the natu-
ral way that data is generated. The ultimate sam-
pling dilemma points out that these two forms of
learning can sometimes trade off with each other
because they expose different aspects of the en-
vironment. As Fiedler (2008) points out, natural
sampling is less likely to bias learners, because
they are exposed to the true patterns in the world
without altering them through their own behav-
ior. This allows them to learn about natural vari-
ation in the world and enables them to gather in-
formation about typicality or frequency, for exam-
ple. On the other hand, artificial sampling, for in-
stance based on an OED model, can have the ben-
efit of being much more efficient for answering a
particular question or for seeking out exemplars
that occur rarely but are highly informative. In
those cases, learning only via natural sampling can
require waiting a long time for these particularly
informative or infrequent patterns to occur. Of
course in some domains, such as causal reasoning,
artificial sampling or active intervention is actu-
ally necessary for uncovering certain relationships
in the environment (Pearl, 2009; Schulz, Kushnir,
& Gopnik, 2007). As a result, some combina-
tion of natural and artificial sampling may be best
for promoting more robust learning (MacDonald
& Frank, 2016). The best way to do this is still up
for debate, however, and there remain key ques-
tions about how other elements, such as the learn-
ers’ conception of a problem, influence learning.
By highlighting the benefits and potential pit-
falls of artificial and natural sampling, the ulti-
mate sampling dilemma quite naturally suggests
how the tension between the two might be re-
solved. Since natural sampling helps build an ac-
curate representation of the statistical properties of
the world, it might be particularly beneficial for
sampling environments that are novel and about
which a learner lacks knowledge regarding the
most important features or variables. Thus, natural
sampling through passive observation forms a nat-
ural first step during inquiry in a novel domain, be-
fore being followed by more targeted hypothesis-
driven inquiry. Of course, an important empirical
question is if people are able to determine the best
point at which to switch from one mode of ques-
tioning to the other (Tversky & Edwards, 1966).
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Stopping rules. Besides choosing what to
learn, people often face the question when to
stop searching for information. This question
is particularly relevant when reaching absolute
certainty is unlikely or impossible and learners
have to decide when their current level of infor-
mation is “enough”. OED models (see Question
3) make predictions about when stopping becomes
more desirable than making additional queries,
but the problem can be formalized more broadly
for scenarios in which the content of samples
is trivial (i.e., problems that do not require an
OED model to select particular queries). A
common approach is to use principles of optimal
control theory and dynamic programming (some
of the work presented in this section takes this
approach, see also Edwards, 1965; Ferguson,
1989, 2012). In psychology, the stopping question
has been approached in different ways. While
some researchers have studied whether people
collect too much or too little information given
the cost structure of a task, others have looked at
the impact of stopping decisions on subsequent
beliefs and behaviors. Here, we will investigate
the second question, as it reveals some subtle ways
in which control during learning can affect our
beliefs.
How stopping decisions shape our experience.
A separate line of research investigated what effect
(optimal) stopping strategies have on people’s ex-
periences and beliefs about the world.
Stopping decisions can be the source of dis-
torted views of people’s environment. For exam-
ple, stopping rules can lead to asymmetric knowl-
edge about different options if these options have
valence of some sort (i.e. they can be rewarding
or not). A good example is the so-called hot stove
effect (Denrell & March, 2001). Loosely speaking,
it is the tendency to underestimate the quality of
novel or risky prospects that happen to yield low
rewards early on and are subsequently avoided.
Having a single bad experience at a new restaurant
might deter customers from re-visiting and poten-
tially correcting that bad impression in the future.
Since some bad experiences happen to be excep-
tions, some restaurants end up being undervalued
as a consequence. On the other hand, a coinci-
dental positive experience will not lead to a cor-
responding overvaluation because decision mak-
ers will likely revisit these restaurants to reap more
benefits and eventually find out their “true” value
via regression to the mean. If it turns out the ini-
tial good experience was an exception, customers
will eventually realize this and correct their good
impression. Similar effects have been observed
in other tasks that involve choice-contingent in-
formation, like approach-avoid decisions (Rich &
Gureckis, 2014), or situations in which access to
feedback is asymmetric across prospects (Le Mens
& Denrell, 2011).
This work demonstrates the potentially large
impact that the seemingly innocuous decision of
stopping search can have on how we perceive the
world. By choosing to learn more about options
that we think are rewarding and ignoring those
that we suspect to be bad, we can end up with
widely asymmetric beliefs. Such asymmetries can
be the source of misconceptions with potentially
problematic effects. On a social level, for example,
they can produce and solidify stereotypes about
people or whole social groups, or increase social
conformity (Denrell & Le Mens, 2007). They
can also lead to unnecessary risk-aversion and
resistance to change (because good but variable
prospects are more likely to yield low initial re-
wards), which can be harmful for both individuals
and organizations in the long run. Future work
should further investigate the impact of stopping
decisions on people’s beliefs and judgments
as well as determining methods of mitigating
stopping-induced biases.
Summary. The results reviewed in this section
highlight that optimal inquiry is not just a function
of selecting the right queries to answer one’s ques-
tions in an OED sense. It also involves knowing
the right time to switch between active and passive
learning, realizing the right moment to terminate
search, and being aware of the conditions under
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which our self-selected data was generated. While
existing results primarily stem from the judgment
and decision-making literature, these issues hold
relevance for educators because they help to lay
out expectations about when active inquiry will
succeed or fail as a pedagogical strategy. Similarly,
the problem of deciding when to stop searching for
information is crucial for many inquiry tasks, like
dividing up study time for different material that
will appear on a quiz, asking questions in emer-
gency situations when time is of the essence, or
deciding when one has collected enough data to fi-
nally start writing a manuscript. Making the wrong
stopping decisions in any of these scenarios can
have unintended negative consequences and undo
any benefits that carefully executed OED methods
have accrued.
Question 9: What is the developmental trajec-
tory of inquiry abilities?
The OED hypothesis has been particularly influ-
ential in work on children’s exploration and learn-
ing (Gopnik, 2012). To provide an extensive re-
view of the large literature on children’s inquiry
behavior is beyond the scope of this paper (see
Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; Schulz, 2012b, for ex-
cellent summaries). However, it is important to
consider a few of the developmental issues in-
volved in inquiry skills, particularly when these
touch on core concepts related to OED.
The child as optimal scientist. A growing
number of studies suggest that even young chil-
dren are surprisingly sophisticated at detecting
opportunities to obtain useful information. For in-
stance, Stahl and Feigenson (2015) showed infants
objects, some of which moved in ways that violate
physical laws (e.g., solid objects that appear to
move through solid walls). Subsequently, infants
were found to explore these objects preferentially,
even going so far as to perform actions like
banging them on the floor to test their solidity (see
also Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, & Schulz,
2012). Similarly, preschool aged children have
been shown to devote more exploratory play to
a toy after being shown confounded evidence for
how it works (Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007; Cook
et al., 2011; van Schijndel, Visser, van Bers, &
Raijmakers, 2015). Children also seem to integrate
subtle social cues to help guide their exploration,
such as exploring more when an adult teacher pro-
vides uninformative instruction (Gweon, Palton,
Konopka, & Schulz, 2014). Still further, some
evidence suggests that children can effectively test
simple causal hypotheses through interventions
that maximize information (Kushnir & Gopnik,
2005; McCormack et al., 2016; Schulz, Gopnik, &
Glymour, 2007).
Based on such findings, researchers have argued
that children act in ways analogous to scientific
experientation (Schulz, 2012b). Gopnik (2009)
writes “When they play, children actively experi-
ment on the world and they use the results of these
experiments to change what they think.” (p. 244).
In some areas of cognitive development these abil-
ities are viewed as directly supporting the idea of
the “child as an optimal scientist”. The core of
this idea, and what brings it into alignment with
OED, is that children’s prior knowledge, beliefs,
and goals help to structure their information gath-
ering behaviors.
While it is important and intriguing that young
children show so many early signs of successful
information gathering, not all of these behaviors
need be thought of as following exclusively from
OED principles. For example, a child might se-
lectively play with a toy after being shown con-
founded evidence about how it works without con-
sidering alternative hypotheses about the causal
structure (Schulz, 2012a). Likewise, if exploration
always follows violations in expectations, eventu-
ally learning will cease because most of the time
(e.g., outside the lab) the world works in reliable
and predictable ways (Schulz, 2015). As a result,
it is important to keep in mind alternative views on
children’s exploration. For example, Hoch, Rach-
wani, and Adolph (in review) describe how in-
fants have seemingly haphazard exploration ten-
dencies. Using head-mounted eyetrackers, these
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studies show that infants rarely move directly to-
ward focal locations (toys placed in different areas
of a room) while walking or crawling that they had
previously fixated while stationary, as might be ex-
pected with goal directed exploration. In addition,
they move around empty rooms just as much as
ones filled with interesting and novel toys (Hoch,
O’Grady, & Adolph, in review). The opposing per-
spective offered by this work is that infants are not
identifying possibilities for new information and
strategically orienting toward them but instead en-
gage in “high-variance” motor plans that discover
information almost by serendipity.
The difference between these viewpoints relects
one of the key issues in evaluating the OED frame-
work that we have raised throughout this article. It
is possible that there is some set of goals and be-
liefs that makes the apparently haphazard behavior
of infants in Hoch et al. (in review) make sense
as an optimal information seeking strategy. How-
ever, it is also useful not to lose sight of questions
about what might change and develop across child-
hood. As we have reviewed through this article,
actually implementing OED-style computations is
a complex cognitive ability requiring the coordi-
nation of hypotheses, actions, evidence, and learn-
ing. It is clear that precisely adhering to the OED
framework (especially in messier, real world en-
vironments) requires more than what young chil-
dren have so far been shown to do. For exam-
ple, after kids identify opportunities for knowledge
gain, they also have to figure out the best way to
get that knowledge, and (as reviewed below) that
has proven difficult, especially in complicated sit-
uations.
In the following sections we review three key de-
velopmental issues related to OED. First, we con-
sider how the issue raised in Question 1 (hypothe-
sis generation) bears on developmental changes in
inquiry behavior. Next we review evidence about
inquiry in more formal classroom situations. Fi-
nally, we discuss children’s question asking, an im-
portant type of inquiry behavior available after ac-
quiring language. Throughout we attempt to focus
our review on how existing evidence bears on the
core computations assumed by OED models and
how components of this model might change over
the course of development.
Explaining children’s variability via hy-
pothesis sampling. One attempt to reconcile
the view that children are optimal scientists but
also seemingly random in their exploration is to
acknowledge that children do not apply OED prin-
ciples consistently or as well as adults, and instead
exhibit more variable behavior (Cook et al., 2011;
Schulz, 2012b). Children might simply enter the
world with a broader hypothesis space, weaker
priors, and/or fewer cognitive resources, which
translates to seemingly noisy or more exploratory
behavior (Bonawitz, Denison, Griffiths, & Gopnik,
2014; Bonawitz, Denison, Gopnik, & Griffiths,
2014; Denison et al., 2013; Gopnik & Wellman,
2012). Computationally, this might be consistent
with approximate Bayesian inference by sampling
hypotheses from the posterior, similar to the ratio-
nal process models described under Question 1. In
fact, Gopnik and colleagues have recently argued
that the development of both internal (hypothesis
sampling) and external (i.e., exploratory play,
information generation actions) search may be
akin to simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt,
& Vecchi, 1983) where increasingly random and
undirected search strategies in infancy slowly
transition to more stable and structured patterns
through to adulthood (Buchsbaum, Bridgers,
Skolnick-Weisberg, & Gopnik, 2012). In some
cases this can even lead younger learners to find
solutions that evade adults by avoiding local
minima (e.g., Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015).
Hypothesis sampling models can capture more
or less variable behavior given different parameters
(e.g., the number of samples taken) and thus pro-
vide one computational mechanism that naturally
accommodates developmental change. Such an
account might also accommodate the undirected
exploration of Hoch et al. with the idea that the
variability in the behavior is slowly “turned down"
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over the course of development2. Overall this
approach seems promising as long as one keeps in
mind the caveats raised about this approach under
Question 1 above. For instance, sampling models
so far tend to ignore deep integration with other
cognitive processes (e.g., memory retrieval), and
they also raise the question whether extremely
variable behavior generated by such models can
even be properly described as optimal in a way
that captures the spirit of the child-as-scientist
metaphor. In addition, applying such a model to
explain the behavior of very young children can
be very difficult because it is hard to identify what
hypothesis space should be sampled (e.g. in Stahl
& Feigenson, 2015, what hypothesis spaces about
the physical world do children consider?).
Nevertheless, this approach remains a fertile
area for exploration. One obvious empirical
prediction of this theory is that the major change
in inquiry behavior across development does not
necessarily manifest in absolute performance but
in inter-subject variability. This suggests a slightly
different focus for developmental research which
is often framed in terms of when children achieve
adult performance in a task. If children are optimal
but noisy, the key issue should be characterizing
changes in variability.
Inquiry in the science classroom. The con-
cept of inquiry as a cognitive activity has been
hugely influential in science education (Inhelder
& Piaget, 1958; Z. Chen & Klahr, 1999; Kuhn et
al., 2000). A key focus has been to teach general
strategies for learning about causal structure (e.g.,
how variables such as water, fertilizer, or sunlight
might influence the growth of a plant in a science
lab, see Klahr et al., 1993). However, compared
to the developmental literature reviewed above, the
conclusion of much of this research is that children
often struggle into early adolescence with learning
and implementing such strategies. For instance, as
reviewed in Question 6, children famously have
trouble learning the principle of controlling vari-
ables (i.e., changing one thing at a time) and ap-
plying it spontaneously to new problems (Z. Chen
& Klahr, 1999; Klahr & Nigam, 2004). That is,
without the right kinds of instruction, young chil-
dren tend to want to change many things at once,
rather than testing individual factors or variables
of a causal system in isolation. One reason for
this preference, identified by Kuhn et al. (2000),
is that children often have not developed a metas-
trategic understanding of why controlling variables
works and what different inferences are warranted
by conducting a confounded versus a controlled
experiment. Interestingly, recent analyses show
that the control of variables is an effective, even
optimal (in the OED sense) strategy, only given
particular assumptions about the causal structure
of the environment (Coenen et al., 2017).
A related example stems from work on chil-
dren’s causal reasoning. Bonawitz et al. (2010)
presented young toddlers, preschoolers, and adults
with a sequence of two events (first a block con-
tacted a base of an object and then a toy connected
to the base started spinning). The question was
whether participants subsequently generated an in-
tervention (moving the block to the base) to test
if this event was causally related to the second
one (i.e., the spinning toy). Unlike preschoolers
and adults, toddlers did not perform this hypoth-
esis test spontaneously, although they did come
to anticipate the second event from the first. To
successfully generate actions they required addi-
tional cues, like causal language used by the ex-
perimenter, or seeing direct contact between two
objects (here, the two toys not separated by the
base). The authors hypothesize that this failure to
generate spontaneous interventions might be due
to young children’s inability to recognize the rela-
tionship between prediction and causality, unless
they are explicitly told or shown.
2However, Hoch (personal communication) reports
no evidence of developmental trends in goal directed
walking with age or experience within the age ranges
her research has considered. Cole, Robinson, and
Adolph (2016) found similar rates of goal-directed ex-
ploration in 13-month-old (novice walkers) and 19-
month old (experienced walker) infants.
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In sum, while the previous section provided
evidence that seems to support the idea that
children identify and explore in systematic ways,
claims about the “child as intuitive scientist"
remain complicated by the evidence that chil-
dren struggle learning generalizable strategies
of acquiring information that are most akin to
the actual practice of science (e.g., control of
variables). The question of how kids get from the
well documented motivations and abilities that
emerge in early childhood to the more complex
abilities of older children, adults, and scientists
remains an important contradiction in the field
and is an important area for future work. This
is particularly challenging because it is not clear
what, in terms of computational components,
actually fails when children do not show mastery
of the control of variables. One hint is that it is
sometimes easier for children to acquire the con-
trol of variables strategy for a particular domain or
task than it is to identify how to properly transfer
that strategy to a new domain or task. This suggest
that aspects of problem solving and transfer may
be relevant parts of the answer (Gick & Holyoak,
1983; Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989). In addition,
the two examples described here point out that
some type of metaknowledge about the value and
purpose of “fair tests” is an important precursor for
being able to reliably implement such strategies.
As mentioned above, these issues currently fall
somewhat outside the OED framework which
deals primarily with information action selection
within a defined goal and framework.
Children’s questions. The view of the child
as an optimal (i.e., OED) scientist is further com-
plicated by the literature on children’s question
asking. As described in detail in Question 2, ask-
ing interesting and information questions using
language is important over the course of cogni-
tive development. Children are notorious question
askers, and even young children seem to acquire
question-like utterances within the first few entires
in their vocabulary (e.g., “Eh?” or “Doh?” to mean
“What is that?") (K. Nelson, 1973). It has been hy-
pothesized that these pseudo-words aid in the de-
velopment of language acquisition by coordinating
information requests between the child and care-
giver.
However, it is unclear if children’s questions
reflect any particular sense of optimality (Rothe,
Lake, & Gureckis, in review). Part of the reason
is that most of the education research on question
asking in classrooms has focused on qualitative
distinctions between good and bad questions (see
Graesser et al., 1993; Graesser & Person, 1994;
Chin & Brown, 2002). For example, studies might
observe the types of questions students ask in a
lecture or while reading some text as “deep” (e.g.,
why, why not, how, what-if, what-if-not) in con-
trast with “shallow” questions (e.g., who, what,
when, where). Interestingly, the proportion of deep
questions asked in a class correlate with students’
exam scores (see Graesser & Person, 1994). Such
classification schemes are useful starting places
but do not yet allow us to assess if this behavior
is reflective of specific OED principles.
To that end, more controlled experimental tasks
have shown robust developmental changes in chil-
dren’s question asking behavior. One classic find-
ing is that younger children (e.g., 7 to 8 years
old) often use less efficient question-asking strate-
gies while playing a “20 questions”/"Guess who?”
game compared to older children (e.g., 9 to 11
years old) and adults (Mosher & Hornsby, 1966;
Ruggeri & Lombrozo, 2015). Younger children
have been shown to use very specific question ask-
ing strategies (e.g., “Is it Bill?” “Is it Sally?”)
that potentially rule out one particular hypothesis
at a time (sometimes called hypothesis-scanning
questions). In contrast, older children and adults
ask constraint-seeking question that can more ef-
fectively narrow down the hypothesis space (e.g.,
“Is your person wearing glasses?”, “Is your person
a man?”). This suggests that designing sophisti-
cated testing strategies that pertain to multiple hy-
potheses is another skill that develops over time.
Whether this is due to limitations or changes in
working memory capacity, informational goals, or
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beliefs about the value of evidence is still an open
question.
At least some recent work has attempted to
better understand these patterns. For example,
Ruggeri, et al. (2015) found a developmental
trend in the degree to which children’s questions
matched the predictions of an OED models based
on EIG. However, they explain that the apparent
inefficiency in young children’s questions stems
from younger children adopting inappropriate
stopping rules (asking questions after they have
already determined the correct answer, see Ques-
tion 8 above). In addition, recent work that has
attempted to unpack the contribution to various
component cognitive processes to this ability (e.g.,
isolating the ability to ask questions from the need
to update beliefs on the basis of the answers) has
found a complex relationship between these issues
even among young learners. For example, forcing
children to explicitly update their hypothesis space
with each new piece of evidence actually led them
to ask more optimal questions than a condition
where a computer interface tracked the evidence
for them (which the authors interpret as a type of
“desirable difficulty” during learning, Kachergis,
Rhodes, & Gureckis, 2017).
Summary. The studies reviewed in this sec-
tion give a nuanced view of the development of
inquiry skills. In some cases, even very young
children seem remarkably successful at identifying
opportunities for learning. However, it is also clear
that children show difficulty in many places where
they might be expected to succeed (e.g., in learning
scientific inquiry skill directly, or in formulating
informative questions). To better understand chil-
dren’s inquiry behavior, more work is needed to
unpack the individual components that contribute
to it, such as children’s theories about the world,
their cognitive capacities, and their understanding
of their own actions as means to test theories.
Final Thoughts
In this paper we examine how people ask ques-
tions and inquire about the world. Our review
poses the following question: Are we asking the
right questions about human inquiry? Our synthe-
sis offers two summary insights. First, the OED
hypothesis has contributed a great deal of theoreti-
cal structure to the topic of human inquiry. Quali-
tative theories have been superseded by principled
(and often parameter-free) models that often ex-
plain human behavior in some detail. OED models
have been successful at providing explanations at
different levels of processing including neural, per-
ceptual and higher-level. Human inquiry is a very
rich and open ended type of behavior, so the suc-
cess of the theoretical framework across so many
tasks or situations is remarkable.
However, at the same time OED has rather
severely limited the focus of research on human
inquiry. Of course, constraining research ques-
tions and methods is a necessary (and desirable)
function of a(ny) cognitive model or scientific
paradigm, so we do not claim that finding lim-
itations of OED constitutes a groundbreaking
contribution in and of itself. However, being
aware of how current theories constrain our
thinking and critically reflecting on their merits
is invaluable for the long-term progress of our
field. In this respect we hopefully convinced at
least some readers that the OED theories suffer
from a number of particularly troubling blind
spots. Some of the hardest questions about human
inquiry, including the motivational impetus to
acquire information about particular phenomena,
are hard to accommodate within OED formalisms.
Furthermore, the richer set of situations in which
inquiry proceeds (e.g., natural language question
asking) remain important gaps in our current
understanding. These gaps matter because there
is not currently a plausible way to account for
these behaviors within the bounds of the OED
framework and in many cases it is doubtful that
there ever will be. In addition, these topics are
exactly the situations that are most interesting to
other aligned fields where inquiry is a basic con-
cern. Perhaps the best illustration of the continued
disconnect is the fact that the OED hypothesis has
QUESTIONS ABOUT INQUIRY 45
become a widely adopted and popular approach to
study learning, but has had little or no impact on
current thinking in education. Papers about OED
models are almost never published in education
journals. Certainly some elements of this can be
chalked up to the different roles that formal models
play in different fields. However, it also must be
acknowledged that it still is difficult to apply
OED models outside of the carefully constructed
experimental contexts studied by psychologists.
The nine questions laid out in this paper hope-
fully offer a way forward. We have attempted to
highlight what we see as the most exciting, dif-
ficult, and under-explored questions about human
inquiry. As we suggest throughout this paper, an-
swering these questions will likely require a num-
ber of different experimental paradigms and mod-
eling approaches, many of which do not follow the
classic structure of OED studies. Our hope is that
there are enough ideas presented here that a grad-
uate student might build a thesis around any one
of the topics raised. Before concluding, we believe
it is worthwhile to consider how answers to our
questions could lead to progress in a number of
domains beyond basic cognitive science.
Education. One contribution of this article is
to elucidate the set of constraints and prerequisites
that surround people’s ability to effectively learn
from self-directed inquiry and exploration. We ar-
gued that a solid understanding of these constraints
and their developmental trajectory, as well as, ul-
timately, the development of computational mod-
els that incorporate these constraints will help ap-
ply cognitive science within educational contexts.
What are some insights of future work that could
benefit educational practices?
Take as an example the first question we raise
in this paper, which challenges the assumption that
people can represent all possible hypotheses about
some learning domain. We suggested that future
work should develop models of hypothesis gen-
eration that take into account constraints of the
learner, for instance in terms of their memory pro-
cesses or cognitive resources. Progress in this area
could be directly applicable to the development of
adaptive learning systems, which are growing in
popularity both in schools (e.g., U.S. Department
of Education, 2017) and as part of online learn-
ing tools that are used by the broader population.
The success of adaptive learning systems crucially
relies on being able to predict what information
would be most useful to a user (e.g., what ma-
terials to train, re-train, and test them on). This,
in turn, requires an accurate representation of their
current hypothesis space. Integrating process-level
theories of memory and resource constraints into
models of hypothesis generation could thus lead to
significant improvement of these technologies.
Another important line of research we highlight
in this paper concerns the relationship between
active learning and passive learning (e.g., in the
discussion of the “ultimate sampling dilemma” in
Question 8). We point out that the two modes of
learning yield different benefits and thus work best
in different situations, depending on the context
and current knowledge of the learner. We hope
that future work will develop models that can de-
termine mixtures of those two modes of learning
that optimize learning success in particular subject
areas. Insights from these models could be used,
for example, to design educational interventions in
subjects that rely on combinations of teaching and
experimentation (like many physical and life sci-
ences).
Machine intelligence. OED computations
already play an important role in the field of
machine learning, where they are often used to de-
sign so-called active learning algorithms (Settles,
2010). Active learning is used to select particular
unlabeled items (e.g., images, text, or speech)
and have them labeled by a (human) oracle with
the goal of improving classification of future
items. We have discussed how human active
learning can far exceed this particular situation,
for example with a breadth of different query
types and strategies that preserve computational
tractability of even complex queries. Some types
of queries aim to test concrete hypotheses (these
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are the “classic” OED questions), some seek out
relevant meta-knowledge (feature queries), some
address a particular knowledge gap, and some
merely follow shared conventions (asking “How
are you?”). Building a computational “repertoire”
of these different query types could be especially
valuable for the development of conversational
machine intelligence, like chatbots and digital
assistants, that can ask and answer questions
in conversation with a human. Currently, these
technologies tend to be limited to fairly narrow
domains, beyond which they are unable to respond
adequately to users’ questions. Over the past
few years, Machine Learning researchers have
started to develop models that generate or answer
a broader array of questions, specifically about
images (e.g., Jain, Zhang, & Schwing, 2017;
Ren, Kiros, & Zemel, 2015). However, these
algorithms work by training on large datasets of
question-image pairs, and have no way of taking
into account the context of any given conversation
or features of the user (e.g., their current goal).
Psychologically-inspired models that can adapt to
changes in the subject, context, and goals of the
conversation partner would thus be enormously
helpful in making these tools more flexible and
realistic.
Another point we raised above is the importance
of pragmatics in question asking. To be helpful to
one’s human counterpart and to draw the right con-
clusions from their answers requires at least a ba-
sic model of their knowledge and expectations, as
well as the context of the conversation (e.g., is this
polite small talk, or does this person want me to
teach them something?). Recent work on human-
robot interaction has demonstrated just how impor-
tant it is that people perceive robots, with whom
they collaborate on a joint task, as adapting to
their actions (Fisac et al., 2016). It showed, for
example, that a robot that acts optimally with re-
spect to the task can be immensely frustrating to
their human “partner” if the partner’s strategy hap-
pens to be suboptimal. Computational models of
how humans interpret each other’s questions in a
given context could be used to improve artificial
agents in their ability to account for their conversa-
tion partner’s goals and constraints when answer-
ing and generating questions.
Experimental methods. What are the ramifi-
cations of our discussion for experimental methods
used within psychology? We hope that the work
we reviewed provides yet another set of examples
for why it is informative to study people actively
seeking information. Although this view is not
new and has gained momentum over the past years,
the vast majority of learning experiments still rely
on paradigms in which subjects passively observe
a sequence of stimuli preselected by the exper-
imenter (Gureckis & Markant, 2012). This ap-
proach is desirable because it gives us experimen-
tal control over the information presented to par-
ticipants, but it lacks one of the most crucial com-
ponents of real-world learning, that is, the ability
to change our environment, ask questions, and ex-
plore the world around us. Through the develop-
ment of sophisticated modeling techniques, many
of which are highlighted in this paper, researchers
are now developing research methodologies that
exploit the lack of experimental control, instead of
sacrificing validity because of it. Beyond the OED
framework, we have for example pointed to mod-
els of pragmatic reasoning, sequential sampling,
tree search, or optimal stopping. All of these can
provide windows into different aspects of inquiry
and, taken together, we believe they make giving
up some experimental control worthwhile.
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